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A. Liability of Primary Carrier to Excess Carrier for Judgments in Excess
of Primary Coverage
N American Centennial Insurance Co. v. Canal Insurance Co. I the court
of appeals addressed an issue of first impression in Texas: whether an
excess carrier can maintain a Stowers cause of action against a primary
carrier.2 In this case two people died in a car accident involving a car rented
from General. General had primary coverage with Canal and was repre-
sented in the accident suit by the law firm of Giessel, Stone, Barker &
Lyman. The excess carriers requested that Canal settle the accident suit
with its own funds. Canal refused and as a result the excess carriers settled
the case.
The excess carriers sued Canal and the law firm, alleging breach of duty of
good faith and fair dealing, gross negligence, DTPA violations, 3 and viola-
tions of article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code.4 The defendants moved
for summary judgment, arguing that they owed no duty of good faith and
fair dealing to the excess carriers and that the suit was barred by the statute
of limitations. The trial court granted summary judgment.
Examining out-of-state authorities, the court found three theories used to
permit recovery by the excess carrier from the primary carrier: direct duty,
triangular reciprocity, and equitable subrogation. The doctrine of direct
duty is the idea that the primary carrier owes a direct duty to the excess
carrier to settle a claim against the insured within the policy limits of the
primary policy when a reasonable primary insurer under the same facts
would have done so.5 The doctrine of triangular reciprocity demonstrates
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Law. Partner, Longley & Maxwell, L.L.P., Austin, Texas.
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1. 810 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ granted).
2. G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemn. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1929, holding approved). The Stowers court held that a liability carrier has a duty to
handle the insured's lawsuit as an ordinarily prudent person would in the management of his
own business. Id. at 548. The duty has been extended to all aspects of the liability carrier's
handling of a claim. Ranger County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Guinn, 723 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1987).
3. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 (Vernon 1987 & Vernon Supp. 1992).
4. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981 & Vernon Supp. 1992).
5. See American Centennial Ins. Co. v. American Home Assurance Co., 729 F. Supp.
1228, 1232 (N.D. Ill. 1990); National Union Fire Ins. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 696 F. Supp.
1099, 1101 (E. D.La. 1988); Argonaut Ins. Co., v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Ins. Co., 687
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that the relationship of the insured, the primary carrier, and the excess car-
rier creates a three-way reciprocal duty of care in the conduct of settlement
negotiations. 6 The doctrine of equitable subrogation mandates that when an
insurer pays a loss under a policy, that insurer steps into the shoes of the
insured and becomes equitably subrogated to any cause of action the insured
may have against a third party who caused the lOSS. 7
The court opted for the equitable subrogation theory. First, the court
stated that equitable subrogation does not increase the primary insurer's re-
sponsibilities because the duty owed to the excess carrier is identical to the
duty to the insured.8 Second, the court reasoned that allowing this cause of
action should decrease the risk of excess judgments, which, in turn, should
decrease the amount of excess coverage premiums.9 Third, the court be-
lieved that allowing the cause of action would discourage primary carriers
from "gambling" with excess carriers' coverage when potential judgments
are close to the primary's policy limits. This would encourage fair and rea-
sonable settlements and would promote judicial economy.10
Still, the court of appeals held that the Stowers duty is only applicable to
the insurer and not to the insurer's agents." The excess carrier therefore
could not maintain the cause of action against the law firm.' 2
B. Liability of Primary Carrier to Insured for Excess Judgments
In Garcia v. American Physicians Insurance Exchange 13 Dr. Garcia was
sued for medical malpractice by Cardenas. Both Insurance Corporation of
America (ICA) and American Physicians Insurance Group (APIE), man-
aged by American Physicians Service Group, Inc. (APSG), insured Garcia
F. Supp. 911, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Bohn v. Sentry Ins. Co., 681 F. Supp. 357, 362 (E.D. La.
1988), aff'd, 868 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1989); Estate of Penn v. Amalgamated Gen. Agencies,
148 N.J.Super. 419, 372 A.2d 1124, 1127 (App. Div. 1977); Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co.
v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 93 A.D.2d 337, 462 N.Y.S.2d 175, 178 (App. Div. 1983), aff'd 61
N.Y.2d 569, 463 N.E.2d 608, 475 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1984).
6. See Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal.App.3d 124, 132, 35, 156 Cal. Rptr.
360, 365-67 (Ct. App. 1979).
7. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 164 Ariz. 286,
291, 792 P.2d 749, 754 (1990); Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 76
Cal.App.3d 1031, 1050-1051, 143 Cal.Rptr. 415, 427 (Ct. App. 1978); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Trav-
elers Indem. Co., 389 So.2d 272, 274-76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Home Ins. Co. v. North
River Ins. Co., 192 Ga. App. 551, 385 S.E.2d 736, 740 (Ct. App. 1989); Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 308 Md. 315, 319-21, 519 A.2d 202, 204-205 (1987); Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 426 Mich. 109, 119, 393 N.W.2d 479, 483 (1986);
Continental Casualty Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, 8, 238 N.W.2d 862, 864 (1976);
Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Ohio St. 2d 221, 404 N.E.2d 759, 762 (1980);
Maine Bonding & Casualty Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 298 Or. 514, 520, 693 P.2d 1296, 1300
(1985). Accord Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Medical Protective Co., 570 F. Supp. 964, 975 (D.Kan.
1983); Home Ins. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 68 Misc.2d 737, 327 N.Y.S.2d 745, 748 (Sup. Ct.
1972), aff'd, 39 A.D.2d 678, 332 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (App. Div. 1972).
8. American Centennial Ins. Co., 810 S.W.2d at 252.
9. Id. at 253.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 254.
12. Id.
13. 812 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ granted).
1890 [Vol. 45
INSURANCE LAW
during the period he treated Cardenas. ICA and APIE agreed to share
equally the defense costs and to allocate any settlement or verdict in propor-
tion to the respective amounts of coverage. Within a week before trial,
APIE informed Garcia that it would not provide coverage since Cardenas'
pleadings did not allege any acts of negligence during APIE's policy period.
Cardenas amended his pleadings to reflect negligent acts that occurred dur-
ing APIE's coverage period but APIE refused to reenter the case.
Garcia and Cardenas agreed to an assignment of Garcia's claims against
the insurers, providing that Cardenas would look only to the proceeds of the
policies to satisfy any judgment against Garcia. The trial court rendered
judgment of $2,235,483.30 plus interests and costs against Garcia. 14 Garcia,
in turn, sued ICA and APIE, alleging negligence and mishandling his de-
fense, breach of contract by abandoning his defense and failing to investi-
gate, negotiate, and settle the suit, DTPA violations, Insurance Code
violations, and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Before the second Garcia case was tried, ICA paid $2 million to Cardenas
in return for a full release, and APIE paid $500,000 in exchange for a contin-
uance and an agreement that its liability would not exceed $2.5 million. The
jury returned a favorable verdict to Garcia on each of his theories. The jury
also found ICA negligent and allocated responsibility of 84% to ICA and
16% to APIE. The award included actual damages of $2,235,000, exem-
plary damages of $250,000, additional damages of $250,000, and attorneys
fees of $820,500. The trial court rendered judgment against APIE and
APSG, jointly and severally, in the amount of $1,331,574 plus post-judg-
ment interest.15
Both sides appealed. The court of appeals increased the judgment against
APIE to $2 million. 16 The court held the correct amount of actual damages
amounted to $635,483.30, calculated by the Cardenas judgment
($2,235,483.30) less the applicable policy limits of $1,600,000 ($1,100,000
for ICA and $500,000 for APIE). 17 The court rejected APIE's argument
that the insurers had already paid $2.5 million and, therefore, Garcia suf-
fered no harm. The court held any belated attempt by the insurers to offer
policy limits or offer payment of excess judgment only after it has been ren-
dered in settlement does not allow the insurer to escape liability under article
21.211s for failing to settle. 19 The court concluded that the $500,000 paid by
APIE purchased only a release from liability above $2 million. 20 Further-
more, APIE was not entitled to any benefit from ICA's $2 million pay-
ment. 21 APIE argued it was entitled to an 84% reduction in damages since
the jury found 84% of Cardenas' harm committed during ICA's coverage
14. Id. at 30.
15. Id. at 29.
16. Id. at 36.
17. Id. at 30.
18. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art 21.21 (Vernon 1981 & Vernon Supp. 1992)
19. Garcia, 812 S.W.2d. at 30.
20. Id. at 31.
21. Id. at 32.
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period. The court held that the failure to defend was an "indivisible" injury
to Garcia and damages therefore should not have been apportioned on a pro
rata basis. 22 Relying on the court of appeal's opinion in Stewart Title Guar-
anty Co. v. Sterling2 3 the court further held there is no statutory right to
indemnification from other defendants in actions under article 21.21 of the
Texas Insurance Code.24
APIE argued that the nonexecution agreement between Garcia and Car-
denas nullified any damages Garcia sustained from the excess judgment and
therefore, APIE should not be held liable. APIE relied on Whatley v. City of
Dallas25 which held that "a covenant not to enforce a judgment against an
insured individually will prevent recovery against an insurer in excess of pol-
icy limits."'26 The court of appeals distinguished Whatley because it did not
involve excess liability resulting from insurer negligence and bad faith. 27
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the covenant not to execute did not
eliminate Garcia's damages and thus did not affect APIE's liability to Gar-
cia.28 The court held that a covenant not to execute is a contract and not a
release. 29 Accordingly, the "tortfeasor is still 'legally obligated' to the in-
jured party, and the insurer is still bound by its contractual promise to
pay." 30
The court rejected APIE's arguments that the nonexecution agreement
violated a "no action" provision in the policy and was against public policy
because it undermined the "personalized relationship based on confidence
and trust" between the insurer and insured. 31 First, the court held that an
insurance company cannot insist on compliance with the policy after it has
refused to perform its policy obligation to defend or settle. 32 Next, the court
held there is no violation of public policy in upholding nonexecution agree-
ments unless they are procured through collusion. The court reasoned
22. Id. at 31-32.
23. 772 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989) rev'd 822 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.
1992). In Stewart the supreme court decided the issue of whether a judgment against one
tortfeasor should be credited by the amount of the settlement obtained from the other
tortfeasors. The primary holding of the case is that a non-settling defendant is entitled to a
post-trebling credit for the amount paid to the injured plaintiff in compensation of a claim for
an injury under the one satisfaction rule and the contribution scheme in TEX. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 32.001 (1986). Id. at 323. Hence, Stewart Title's damages were assessed at $200,000
while the amount of the total settlements from the settling tortfeasors were equal to $400,000.
Id. at 321. Under this scenario, the supreme court opined that first you treble the actual
damages found against Stewart (i.e., $200,000 X 3 = $600,000) and then subtract the amount
of settlements received from the settling tortfeasors (i.e., $400,000) to come up with a net
recovery of $200,000 in favor of the plaintiff under the one satisfaction rule. Id. at 321-322.
The supreme court noted that the one satisfaction rule applies to prevent a plaintiff from ob-
taining more than one recovery for the same injury. Id. at 322.
24. Garcia, 812 S.W.2d at 32.
25. 758 S.W.2d 301, 310 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
26. Garcia, 812 S.W.2d at 32.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 32-33.
29. Id. at 32.
30. Id.




"once an insured has been left alone to defend himself it is reasonable that he
covenant against his own liability and hold the costs of his defense to a mini-
mum if he can."'33
APIE argued there could be no liability for refusing to settle without evi-
dence that the injured party would have agreed to the insured's policy limits.
APIE also claimed it was never given the opportunity to settle with Carde-
nas without ICA. The court cited several instances in which Cardenas at-
tempted to negotiate with APIE, but to no avail. 34 The court reasoned that
the insurer is not required to respond to an unconditional settlement offer
but does have the duty to "investigate, prepare for the defense of the lawsuit,
try the case and make reasonable attempts to settle."' 35 Relying on Stow-
ers,36 the court concluded that an insurer is liable for damages when he re-
fuses a settlement offer that an ordinary, prudent person in the same
situation would have accepted. 37 The court upheld the jury findings that
APIE's refusal to negotiate or settle violated the DTPA and article 21.21 of
the Insurance Code.38
C. Duty of Excess Carrier to Insured
In Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Aries Marine
Corp. 39 the Fifth Circuit held the excess liability insurer has no duty to de-
fend the insured after the primary carrier becomes insolvent.4° Lynch was
injured while working on a ship owned by Aries. Lynch filed suit against
Aries. Glacier, the primary carrier, defended Aries in the suit until the in-
surer became insolvent. Arkwright, the excess carrier, participated in the
case to protect its excess coverage. Arkwright settled with Lynch without
objection from Aries. The controversy arose in deciding whether Arkwright
or Aries should bear the amount of Glacier's $500,000 liability. Aries re-
fused to contribute other than the amount of the deductible ($25,000). Ark-
wright funded the entire settlement and sought indemnification from Aries.
Arkwright sued Aries for reimbursement of the $500,000 retained limit.
The district court held that Arkwright had assumed the defense of Aries by
intervening in the settlement negotiations and, as a result, was estopped from
seeking indemnity. 41 The Fifth Circuit disagreed. The court held that insur-
ers are estopped from denying coverage when they initiate a defense without
a reservation of right to later deny coverage upon a policy defense. 42 Still,
the court held that the duty to reserve rights is part of the duty to defend
33. Id.
34. Id. at 33-34.
35. Id. at 34.
36. Stowers, 15 S.W.2d at 547.
37. Garcia, 812 S.W.2d at 34.
38. Id. at 34-35.
39. 932 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1991).
40. Arkwright-Boston, 932 F.2d at 445. See Emscor, Inc. v. Alliance Ins. Group, 804
S.W.2d 195, 198-199 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
41. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aries Marine Corp., 736 F. Supp. 1447,
1451-52 (S.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd 932 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1991).
42. Arkwright-Boston, 932 F.2d at 445.
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and, as excess carrier, Arkwright had no duty to defend.43 The court went
further in finding that participation by legal representation in settlement ne-
gotiations was not tantamount to assuming the defense. 44 Therefore, Ark-
wright was not estopped from denying coverage on the $500,000.
Aries argued that the language in the excess carrier policy indicated that
the primary carrier's policy limit was covered under the excess carrier policy
since the event of Glacier's insolvency was not otherwise covered.45 The
court interpreted the language to hold that the claim was covered by under-
lying insurance through Glacier because the policy covered injuries aboard
the ship.46 "The fact that the insurance was not collectible because of Gla-
cier's insolvency is irrelevant."'47
The court also rejected the argument that Arkwright settled the Lynch
suit as a "volunteer."' 48 The court recognized that Arkwright consistently
informed Aries of its intent and efforts to seek indemnification and that Ark-
wright paid only out of a desire to avoid greater liability.49
Finally, the court concurred with Aries in the notion that a joint
tortfeasor who settles with the injured cannot later seek indemnity from the
nonsettling tortfeasor. 50 The court held, however, that Arkwright was not a
joint tortfeasor with Aries. Consequently, Arkwright's right to indemnifica-
tion stemmed not from negligence but from a contractual right to enforce
the retained limit of the policy. 51
D. Statute of Limitations
In American Centennial Insurance Co. 52 the primary carrier refused to
settle an accident suit. As a result, the excess carrier settled and then sued
the primary carrier for breach of the Stowers duty. Addressing the statute of
limitations issue, the court of appeals stated that an action based on the
Stowers doctrine must be brought within two years of the day the cause of
action accrues.5 3 The court explained that the cause of action for breach of
the Stowers duty accrues when the judgment in the underlying suit is final.5 4
The judgment in the accident suit was signed on February 3, 1986, while the
excess carrier filed suit against the primary carrier on January 21, 1988. The
43. Id.
44. id.
45. Id. at 446. The language reads "[L]imits of Liability- Underwriters shall only be lia-
ble for the excess of either-. . .(b) $25,000. Ultimate Net Loss in respect of each occurrence not
covered by said underlying insurances ... .
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 447.
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Jinkins, 739 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1987).
51. Id.
52. 810 S.W.2d 246. For full discussion of the facts see supra note 1 and accompanying
text.
53. Id. at 254 (relying on TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon
1986)).




court thus found the cause of action for breach of the Stowers duty was not
barred by the statute of limitations. 5"
II. DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
A. Standing to Sue
In Bowman v. Charter General Agency, Inc. 56 Bowman suffered injury to
her car when she collided with Lee. She signed a waiver of release against
Lee. Charter, Lee's insurer, offered payment to Bowman if she would sign a
waiver of recompense for the rental vehicle and lost time at work. Bowman
refused to sign the waiver and, as a result, Glover, the insurance adjuster,
declined to surrender the check for repairs. Bowman sued the carrier for
negligent and intentional infliction of mental anguish, gross negligence,
fraud, and violations of the Insurance Code. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment against Bowman without stating the basis for its decision. 7
The court of appeals upheld the summary judgment, concluding that the
defendant did not owe Bowman a duty of good faith and fair dealing.58 The
court reasoned that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is imposed on an
insurer because of the "disparity of bargaining power" between the insurer
and the insured.5 9 The court held that this rationale does not apply when
dealing with third parties because no contractual relationship exists between
the insurer and the third party.6°
In St. Paul Guardian Insurance Co. v. Luker 6t the court of appeals found
that an insurer owes a duty of good faith and fair dealing to a third party
when the policy was purchased to protect the third party's interest. Kim
and Teri Luker lived in a house owned by Kim's father. Kim personally
paid the full insurance premium on the house and $27,000 of contents. Jof-
frion, the insurance agent, assured Kim that he was covered by the policy
even though the policy was held in his father's name, since he was the legal
owner of the house.
The house burned and there was evidence of arson. St. Paul paid Emmett
Luker's claim for the house but refused Kim's claim on the contents. St.
Paul denied the content claim on three grounds: Kim and his wife, Ten', or
someone instructed by them, caused the fire; Kim and Teri misrepresented
their losses; and the policy insured only the father's interest in personal
property on the premises.
The court held that "[w]hen a person contracts with an insurer for the
benefit of another, both the person contracting and the third party have the
right to expect that the insurer would owe the same duty to the designated
55. Id. at 255.
56. 799 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
57. Id. at 379.
58. Id. at 381.
59. Id. at 380. See Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. 1988).
60. Bowman, 799 S.W.2d at 380.
61. 801 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ).
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third party as it would to the person making the contract."' 62 The court con-
cluded that the insurer agreed to insure a third party beneficiary and there-
fore owed that party the same duty of good faith and fair dealing as it did to
the purchaser of the policy. 63 Luker is the first case that explicitly extends
the duty of good faith and fair dealing to third party beneficiaries. 64
B. Definition of Duty: Jury Charge
The supreme court held that insurers owe a duty of good faith and fair
dealing to their insureds in Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance
Co. 65 The duty arises as a result of the special relationship caused by dispar-
ity of bargaining power between the insurer and insured and the exclusive
control the insurer has over claims. 66 The Arnold court held that a cause of
action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is stated when
there is no reasonable basis for denial or delay of a claim or for the insurer's
failure to determine whether there is any reasonable basis for the denial or
delay.67
The supreme court revisited the duty of good faith and fair dealing in
holding that a workers' compensation claimant is entitled to the duty from
the insurance carrier in Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North America 68 The
court held that a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is estab-
lished when the claimant proves the lack of a reasonable basis for denying or
delaying payment of a claim and that the insurer knew or should have
known that there was not a reasonable basis for denial or delay.69 The court
explained that the first element of the test required an objective determina-
tion, while the second element "balances the right of an insurer to reject an
invalid claim and the duty of the carrier to investigate and pay compensable
claims." 70
In Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford Connecticut v. Davila 71 the court
of appeals determined the appropriate jury instruction regarding breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing.72 As the result of a disagreement
between David and Donna Davila, David called the police. While the police
were questioning David, Donna discovered a fire in her closet. She immedi-
62. Id. at 618.
63. Id. (citing Quilter v. Wendland, 403 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Tex. 1966) (third party benefici-
ary has cause of action to enforce a contract)).
64. In Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am. the supreme court held the duty of good faith
and fair dealing extended to worker's compensation claimant. Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 212.
65. 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987).
66. Id. ("special relationship arises out of the parties' unequal bargaining power and the
nature of insurance contracts which would allow unscrupulous insurers to take advantage of
their insureds' misfortunes .... ").
67. Id. The court found the duty of good faith and fair dealing equivalent to the Stowers
duty when the insurer is held to the same degree of care a prudent man would exercise in the
management of his own business. See Stowers 15 S.W.2d at 547.
68. Aranda, 748 S.W.2d 210.
69. Id. at 213.
70. Id.
71. 805 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
72. Id. at 903-04.
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ately accused David of setting fire to her clothes. The insurer denied the
claim based on this accusation. Consequently, the Davilas sued for breach
of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of
the DTPA. The jury found for the Davilas on all counts and awarded
$333,008.22. 73
The court of appeals addressed Automobile's contention of an improper
jury instruction regarding bad faith. The trial judge offered as instruction:
In order for the conduct of an insurance company in denying or delay-
ing payment of a claim to constitute a failure to exercise good faith, it
must be shown that the insurer had no reasonable basis for denying the
claim or delaying payment or the insurer failed to determine whether
there was any reasonable basis for the delay.74
The insurer offered its own version of a proper jury instruction:
In order for the conduct of the insurance company in denying or delay-
ing payment of a claim to constitute a failure to exercise good faith, it
must be shown that the insurer denied or delayed payment of the claim
at a time when it knew it had no reasonable basis for denying the claim
or delaying the payment of the claim or the insurer failed to determine
whether there was any reasonable basis for delay. 7"
The court noted that the instruction actually submitted tracked Arnold,
while the instruction tendered by the insurance company tracked Aranda.76
The court recognized that the Aranda formulation requires that the insurer
must know it had no reasonable basis for denying the claim, but that this
requirement is met by actual knowledge "or by establishing that the carrier,
based on its duty to investigate, should have known that there was no rea-
sonable basis for denial or delay." 77 Since the submitted instruction in-
cluded failure to investigate, which "relates to what the insurer 'should have
known' about the reasonableness of its denial," the submitted instruction
was not erroneous.78
C Reasonable Basis for Denial or Delay
1. Recovery Denied; "Bona Fide Dispute"
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Hudson Energy Co. 79 Hudson
was insured as a private pilot. While in flight with his instructor, Bishop,
Hudson lost control of the plane. Both pilots regained control and landed
safely until the nose sank and caused the plane to flip over. Hudson Energy
filed a claim for damage to the plane. National Union denied coverage on
the basis that Hudson was not qualified as a private pilot and that the policy
73. Id. at 901.
74. Id. at 903.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 904.
77. Id. (quoting Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 213).
78. Id.
79. 780 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989), aff'd, 811 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1991).
Note that, although the court of appeals decision was handed down before the Survey period,
it is included in this paper to explain the bona fide dispute issue.
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did not cover multi-person control of the plane. Hudson sued, claiming im-
proper application of the policy exclusions and breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing. The jury found for Hudson, and the trial court
awarded $114,440 in actual damages, $75,000 in exemplary damages, and
$40,000 in attorney fees. 80
The court of appeals affirmed the award of policy benefits but reversed the
exemplary damage award based on breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing. The court found that since there was a reasonable fact question as
to who was actually piloting the plane at the time of the accident, as well as a
legitimate question of policy interpretation, there was no evidence of bad
faith.81 The court of appeals held that a bona fide controversy is a reason-
able basis for denial or delay in payment of a claim.82 The court concluded
that questions regarding Hudson's control over the aircraft at the time of
loss, as well as Hudson's qualifications as represented in the insurance appli-
cation, were reasonable grounds for the insurer to deny the claim.83
Furthermore, the court held that delay or refusal to pay are not unreason-
able when policy interpretation is legitimately at issue.84 The court reasoned
that since National Union's interpretation was reasonable, the controversy
justified denial of the claim.85 The supreme court affirmed Hudson Energy
on grounds of contract interpretation.8 6
Several cases have cited Hudson Energy in reasoning that a bona fide dis-
pute justifies delay or denial of payment. For example, in St. Paul Guardian
Insurance Co. v. Luker8 7 the insurer, St. Paul, argued that the question of
whether the Lukers were covered under a policy bought for their benefit, but
not specifically naming them as insured, was a bona fide controversy that
justified the denial of the claim.88 St. Paul further contended that denial of
the claim was appropriate since the issue of coverage of third parties was one
of first impression. The court of appeals conceded that the controversy was
bona fide and was a proper basis for denial or delay of payment.8 9 Still, the
court held that the bona fide controversy ceased to exist when St. Paul filed a
stipulation with the court, agreeing that the policy extended coverage to the
Lukers.90
In St. Paul Lloyd's Insurance Co. v. Fong Chun Huang9 Fong applied for
property insurance for his restaurant. Two days after Fong confirmed cover-
80. Id. at 419.
81. Id. at 427.
82. Id. at 426.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 427.
85. Id. National Union argued that the policy excluded coverage for losses incurred when
more than one person piloted the aircraft or when an unqualified person piloted it. Id.
86. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex.
1991).
87. Luker, 801 S.W.2d at 614. For full discussion of facts see supra note 61 and accompa-
nying text.
88. Id. at 620.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 808 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
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age, the restaurant burned. St. Paul's investigation revealed the restaurant
was uninsured six months prior to the fire and was in financial trouble. The
fire department investigation found evidence of arson and that the building
was secure at the time of the fire, which presumes someone with access to
the building set the fire. St. Paul denied Fong's claim on the evidence of
arson.
Fong sued for breach of contract and the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing. Though both parties stipulated the fire was caused by arson, Fong ar-
gued bad faith in that St. Paul had not diligently sought the identity of the
true arsonist. The jury found St. Paul had breached its good faith duty and
awarded damages for the cash value of the policy.
The Houston court of appeals held St. Paul had a reasonable basis for
denying the claim in presenting a reasonable fact question as to whether the
arson was committed by Fong or someone paid by Fong. 92 The court relied
on the Arnold 93 and Aranda94 tests for the legality of denying a claim. 95
The court cited Hudson Energy96 in stating that a bona fide controversy is a
reasonable basis for the insurer to delay or deny payment.97 The court went
even further in stating that "the insurer need only show that it had a reason-
able basis for believing the insured was at fault" to defeat allegations of
breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing.98
The so-called bona fide dispute defense revolves around whether or not an
insurance company is entitled to summary judgment where there is some
evidence of a bona fide dispute relating to the nonpayment of the underlying
claim. Opponents of the so-called bona fide dispute defense have argued that
in addition to requiring plaintiffs at the summary judgment level to meet a
directed verdict standard, any evidence of good faith and fair dealing on the
part of the insurance company would defeat a plaintiff's jury verdict on
appeal. 99
Conversely, proponents of the so-called bona fide dispute defense point to
the Fifth Circuit applying Texas law which recently recognized that under
the Arnold and Aranda formulations, an insurer is entitled to summary judg-
ment on bad faith claims as long as it can establish it had a "reasonable basis
92. Id. But see Commonwealth Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Thomas, No. 05-90-00785-CV (Tex.
App.-Dallas, Sept. 13, 1991 n.w.h.) (issue of reasonable basis left to the jury); see also 10
Texas Consumer Law Reporter 103, 104 (jury has responsibility of determining the reasona-
bleness of the basis for denial or delay. "If every 'reason,' as viewed by the appellate court is
automatically 'reasonable,' then the right to a jury trial is denied.").
93. See supra text accompanying note 65.
94. See supra text accompanying note 68.
95. Huang, 808 S.W.2d at 526.
96. Hudson Energy, 780 S.W.2d at 426.
97. Huang, 808 S.W.2d at 526.
98. Id. (citing Plattenburg v. Allstate Ins. Co., 918 F.2d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 1990)).
99. For two discussions criticizing the bona fide dispute defense. See Jenks Garrett &
John N. Holland, 'Bona Fide'Dispute: No Defense To The Statutory And Common Law Duties
Of Insurance Companies To Their Insured 2 TEXAS BAD FAITH BULLETIN Oct. 1990 at 5-9;
Philip K. Maxwell, Justifying Insurance Claims Denials: Is Every 'Reason' a 'Reasonable' Ba-
sis?, Speech at the University of Texas Third Annual DTPA Conference (Dec. 1991) (on file
with Southwestern Law Journal.
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for believing" in the lack of coverage.l°°
The Texas supreme court has held, under traditional summary judgment
review, that where the facts are disputed and raise some question as to
whether or not a claim was denied in bad faith, it will be submitted to the
jury.!0 1 It would seem that the standards as set forth in Arnold would al-
most always constitute jury questions whenever there was any kind of fac-
tual dispute relating to the insurance company's conduct or motives.
In Koral Industries v. Security-Connecticut Life Insurance Co. 102 Koral
sought a new life insurance policy for one of its key employees, Lindsey.
Lindsey failed to disclose prior medical treatment in his application, includ-
ing hospitalization on three separate occasions and treatment for depression
and alcohol abuse. Security issued a $1 million life insurance policy naming
Koral as beneficiary. Lindsey died in 1986 and Koral submitted a claim for
the policy proceeds. Upon discovery of the misrepresentations in the appli-
cation, Security denied payment and declared the policy null and void by
tendering all premiums plus interest to Koral.
Koral sued Security, claiming breach of contract, DTPA violations, and
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The jury determined that
Lindsey had made false representations to induce Security to issue the policy
but that Security was aware of facts that would put it on notice to make an
inquiry and as a result uncover Lindsey's fraud. The trial court rendered
judgment for Koral. The court of appeals reversed, relying on Texas author-
ity that provides an insurer must have actual knowledge of the misrepresen-
tation before the insured can defeat a claim of fraudulent inducement. 10 3
Furthermore, the court of appeals held that the misrepresentation defense is
sufficient to deny recovery on the alleged DTPA and good faith/fair dealing
violations. 104
The Texas supreme court denied Koral's application for writ of error and
expressly agreed with the court of appeals that the insurer's misrepresenta-
tion defense is not defeated by the fact that it "should have known" of the
insured's misrepresentations. 105 The court agreed that the defense of mis-
representation was valid to Koral's breach of contract claims and held that
the jury answers, as they related to Security, "negated" the breach of good
faith and fair dealings claims and the actions under the DTPA.10 6
In Plattenburg v. Allstate Insurance Co. 107 Jessie Plattenburg was involved
in an auto accident where she was struck in the rear by an uninsured motor-
ist while backing onto a public street. The investigating officer's report con-
100. See Plattenburg v. Allstate Insurance Company, 918 F.2d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 1990)
Texas 'Bad Faith' Law Since Arnold & Aranda: Evolution of the 'Bona Fide Dispute'Defense, 3
TEXAS BAD FAITH BULLETIN 1 April 1991, at 1-10.
101. Marino v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex. 1990).
102. 788 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990), writ denied per curiam, 802 S.W.2d 650
(Tex. 1990).
103. Id. at 146.
104. Id. at 147.
105. Koral, 802 S.W.2d at 651.
106. Id.
107. 918 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1990).
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cluded that Plattenburg was at fault. Plattenburg later gave a recorded
statement to an Allstate employee in the presence of her attorney of similar
effect. Furthermore, Plattenburg received a citation for "back[ing] not in
safety."108
Plattenburg received $5,000 from Allstate, which was the limit under the
personal injury protection coverage of the insurance policy. Allstate denied
payment on her claim for uninsured motorists' benefits based on its determi-
nation that Plattenburg caused the accident and was therefore excluded
under the policy. Plattenburg sued Allstate, asserting it had breached its
duty of good faith and fair dealing and was negligent in its claim handling.
The district court granted summary judgment for the insurer and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Allstate "had a reasonable basis
for believing that Plattenburg was at fault" given the officer's report, Plat-
tenburg's own statement, and the citation.'°9 The court stated that the facts
at hand did not necessarily legally establish that Plattenburg caused the acci-
dent and therefore a summary judgment might not be appropriate in an ordi-
nary automobile negligence case. 110 5till, the court held Allstate met the
standard in showing it had a reasonable basis for the denial. 11
Next, the court assumed that an insurance company has the duty to rea-
sonably investigate claims.' 2 Based on this assumption, the court held "a
finding that an insurer had a reasonable basis to deny a claim constitutes a
finding that the insurer reasonably investigated the claim." 3 Therefore,
since the court concluded that Allstate had a reasonable basis for denying
the claim, it affirmed summary judgment on the action for negligent claim
handling." 14
In St. Paul Guardian Insurance Co. v. Luker" 5 the court of appeals re-
versed a jury award for damages caused by breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing. St. Paul denied Luker's claim on the contents lost in a fire
on grounds that the fire was caused by arson. On appeal, St. Paul argued
insufficient evidence on the bad faith claim. St. Paul presented evidence that
no one broke into the house, the Lukers had keys, and testimony of a witness
who claimed to have seen Mr. Luker on the premises hours before the house
burned. The Lukers offered rebuttal evidence that no personal belongings
had been removed and that they were told by a real estate agent of a poten-
tial buyer for the house.
108. Id. at 563.
109. Id. (citing Arnold and Aranda).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 564.
113. Id.
114. Id. See 7 Bad Faith Law Report, 15, Feb. 1991 (argues there is no way the insurer can
conduct a negligible investigation and still come up with a reasonable basis for denial.) The
court imposed sanctions of $500 against Plattenburg's attorney to warn all attorneys to be
more selective in their choice of appellate cases and more efficient in their efforts as representa-
tives. Plattenburg, 918 F.2d. at 564.
115. 801 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ). For full discussion of the
facts, see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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The court of appeals found insufficient evidence to support the jury find-
ing of bad faith and reversed the award for exemplary damages. 1 6 The
court recognized the conflicting evidence but concluded that the Lukers did
not provide sufficient evidence to show that St. Paul did not have a reason-
able basis for denying the claim. 117 And yet, after reviewing precisely the
same evidence, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to support
the jury's finding that the Lukers did not commit arson and were entitled to
the policy proceeds.' 18
In General Manufacturing Co. v. CNA Lloyd's of Texas' 19 the court of
appeals upheld the jury's findings of a reasonable basis for denial. 120 Rock-
wall manufactured and sold windows to homebuilders in the Dallas/Fort
Worth area. Rockwall replaced over 10,000 cracked windows at a cost of
over $1.1 million in efforts to preserve business goodwill and mitigate dam-
ages. Rockwall then filed a claim with CNA for coverage under its compre-
hensive general liability policy. "CNA denied coverage based on the
business risk/products exclusion in the policy.' 21 The jury found against
Rockwall on its bad faith claims. The court of appeals agreed that the exclu-
sion was properly applied to this situation and CNA was reasonable in deny-
ing payment. 122
In Rangel v. Hartford Accident & Indemnification Co. 123 the court ex-
tended the issue of reasonable basis for denial or delay only so far as the
parties stipulated. 124 Rangel was injured on the job. He settled his compen-
sation claim with Hartford, signing an agreement that stated: "The liability
of the carrier or the extent of the injury or illness is uncertain, indefinite, or
incapable of being satisfactorily established."' 125 The Industrial Accident
Board expressly approved the settlement agreement during a prehearing
conference.
Rangel sued for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in delay-
ing payment of this claim. Hartford moved for summary judgment, con-
tending that Rangel's suit was barred by the statement regarding uncertainty
of liability of the carrier. Hartford relied on collateral estoppel, equitable
estoppel, and judicial admissions.
The trial court rendered summary judgment for Hartford and the court of
appeals affirmed. In applying Aranda, the court of appeals agreed with
116. Id. at 623.
117. Id. at 622.
118. Id. at 623. But see 10 TCLR 15, Jan. 1991 (one wonders how the court could find
insufficient evidence of arson and also find insufficient evidence on bad faith. "[T]he jury de-
termined there was no arson and thus there was no reasonable basis for denying the claim.
Thus, the finding of bad faith cannot be said to be manifestly unjust.").
119. 806 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
120. Id. at 298.
121. Id. at 299 (policy excluded "property damage to work performed by or on behalf of
the named insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or out of materials, parts, or
equipment furnished in connection therewith . .
122. Id.
123. No. 05-90-00678-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas, Aug. 13, 1991, writ requested).
124. Id. at 5.
125. Id. at 3.
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Hartford that uncertainty of the carrier's liability or uncertainty of the ex-
tent of injury gave Hartford a reasonable basis for delaying payment.1 26 The
court held that Rangel was collaterally estopped from refuting the uncer-
tainty of Hartford's liability by the settlement judgment determined in the
workers' compensation proceeding.127 The court further held that the dis-
junctive wording of the compromise agreement was insignificant in issue pre-
clusion.' 28  Finally, the court held that the uncertainty of liability as
stipulated by the parties was a reasonable basis for denial of payment. 29
Torchia v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. 130 is similar to Rangel. Torchia
sustained a work injury. Aetna provided the workers' compensation insur-
ance. Aetna filed suit to set aside the Torchia award by the Industrial Acci-
dent Board. The parties settled on an agreed judgment whereby Aetna
would pay Torchia $32,500 cash and past medical expenses not to exceed
$35,500. Almost 18 months later, Torchia and his wife sued Aetna, claiming
that Aetna had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing in its disposi-
tion of Torchia's claims by settlement and agreement. Torchia argued that
his release of claims against Aetna in the settlement was without considera-
tion, a unilateral mistake, and procured through bad faith and disparate bar-
gaining power. The trial court rendered summary judgment for Aetna on
grounds that Torchia released any claims he had' 3' and the court of appeals
affirmed.
The court of appeals held that the $32,500 was consideration for release of
both the worker's compensation and breach of duty of good faith and fair
dealing claims.' 32 The court held that one consideration could support the
release of more than one claim.133 The court also held that the money
served as consideration even though Aetna obtained the entire amount
through subrogation.' 34 It reasoned that Aetna was entitled by law to the
subrogation amount so that the right to subrogation did not serve as an ad-
mission that only the compensation claim was released. 135 The court held
Torchia was collaterally and judicially estopped from claiming lack of con-
sideration since he previously conceded the uncertainty of Aetna's
liability.136
The judgment specifically provided that the settlement extended to all
causes of action by Torchia arising out of the manner in which Aetna han-
dled, settled, or defended any of Torchia's claims.' 37 Further, Torchia exe-
126. Id. at 5.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 6.
129. Id.
130. 804 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
131. Id. at 221.




136. Id. at 224.
137. Id. at 222. The relevant portion of the judgment read:
The parties further expressly agreed that their settlement extends to all claims,
demands, and causes of action, which cross-plaintiff [Torchia] may have now or
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cuted an affidavit in which he acknowledged that if the court approved the
settlement he would not be able to collect any further money based on
Aetna's manner in handling, settling, or defending the claim. 138 Finally,
Torchia admitted that the claim was uncertain.
The court held Aetna's duty of good faith ended when Torchia signed the
release, and therefore Aetna could not be held liable for any acts amounting
to bad faith. 139 This is especially so since the court further held that the
parties acted with equal bargaining power.14° Torchia could not persuade
the court that he signed the release as a result of his unilateral mistake in
failing to read the settlement documents first. The court held that parties
have a duty to read what they sign and unilateral mistake is not grounds for
recision of a release, absent fraud in procuring the signature.' 4'
In Gomez v. Hartford Co. of the Midwest 142 several members of the
Gomez family suffered injuries when they were hit by a truck driven by
Hawthorne, who had been drinking at Dudley's. Gomez sued Dudley's, al-
leging negligence in serving alcoholic beverages to the already intoxicated
Hawthorne. Dudley's had a Texas commercial multi peril policy issued by
Hartford. Hartford refused to defend based on a "liquor liability" exclusion
in the policy. Gomez received a $7 million judgment, and Dudley assigned
all claims against Hartford to Gomez.
Gomez then sued Hartford and its agent, alleging gross negligence and
intentional bad faith in refusing to defend and settle the claims against Dud-
ley's. The trial court granted summary judgment for Hartford, whose case
was severed from the claims against the agent.
On appeal, Gomez argued that there was a fact issue whether the policy
could reasonably be interpreted to impose the duty to defend all personal
injury claims onto Hartford notwithstanding the exclusion. Gomez argued
that Dudley's assumed the policy would include coverage for alcohol-related
incidents since the policy was sold to a tavern. The court of appeals rejected
this argument, because Dudley's belief as to what the policy covered did not
raise a fact issue on coverage, absent allegations that Hartford or its agent
represented to Dudley's that the policy did cover such incidents. 143
Gomez next argued that the policy provision affording coverage was am-
biguous. The language in the policy read:
The Company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the in-
sured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bod-
ily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies .... This
insurance does not apply:
in the future, arising out of the manner in which cross-defendant [Aetna], and
its counsel, handled, settled, or defended any of the cross-plaintiff's claims
under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act.
Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 223
140. Id. at 224-25.
141. Id. at 224.




(h) to bodily injury or property damage for which the insured or his
indemnitee may be held liable
(1) as a person or organization engaged in the business of manufactur-
ing, distributing, selling or serving alcoholic beverages .... 144
The court held that this language was unambiguous and therefore did not
impose on Hartford the duty to defend. 145
Gomez argued that an insurer should not be allowed to represent coverage
and defense of bodily injury or property damage and then later refuse to
defend. The court rejected this argument, finding no claim or evidence that
Hartford or its agent represented that the policy included defense and cover-
age to all suits seeking personal injury or property damages. 146
3. Recovery Allowed
State Farm County Mutual Insurance v. Moran 147 provides an example of
an inadequate investigation by an insurer. Moran and his nephew, Rubio,
attempted to tow Moran's truck by attaching a chain from Rubio's truck to
Moran's. En route the tow chain got caught in the front axle of Moran's
truck, causing it to hit Rubio's truck and then roll over. Shortly thereafter,
Texas Department of Public Safety troopers arrested Rubio for driving while
intoxicated. Moran was hospitalized after complaining of chest pains.
Moran subsequently filed claims under an automobile policy with State
Farm that included basic liability coverage and personal injury protection
and damages caused by uninsured/underinsured motorists. State Farm set-
tled Moran's claim for property damage to his truck and $2,461 for medical
expenses covered under the $2,500 person injury protection policy. Moran
applied for additional benefits of $25,000, alleging that Rubio, uninsured,
contributed to the accident when another car entered their lane and Rubio
lost control of his vehicle, which caused the tow chain to wrap around Mo-
ran's truck.
State Farm denied the claim for additional benefits on the ground that
either the third car or Moran's own negligence caused the accident or that
Moran assumed the risk when he allowed Rubio to tow his vehicle. Moran
sued State Farm on the basis that he sustained injury as a direct and proxi-
mate result of Rubio's negligence, and that State Farm breached its duty of
good faith and fair dealing by denying the claim without any reasonable
basis or a proper investigation of the claim. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of Moran, and the trial court awarded judgment on the verdict. 148
The appellate court overruled State Farm's challenge to the sufficiency of
evidence that there was no reasonable basis to deny Moran's claim and
found that State Farm would have known there was no basis for denial had
144. Id.
145. Id. at 442.
146. Id.; see also Thornhill v. Houston Gen. Lloyds, 802 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
147. 809 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). Note that this case
was reversed on lack of evidence to support allegations of DTPA violations.
148. Id. at 617 (citing Aranda, 748 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. 1988)).
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it properly investigated the claim. The court referred to Aranda, holding
that the insured must establish (1) the absence of a reasonable basis for de-
nial or delay of payment of a claim and (2) that the insurer knew or should
have known that there was not a reasonable basis for denial or delay. 1 49 The
court held that, had State Farm conducted an investigation that included
questioning both Rubio and Moran, it would have discovered that Rubio
was attributed blame for the accident and that such an investigation would
have revealed that no reasonable basis for denial existed. 150
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Zubiate 1 51 also involved
the failure to adequately investigate. Sylvia Zubiate suffered personal injury
and damage to her vehicle when she collided with a truck in Juarez, Mexico.
She filed claims with State Farm for collision, personal injury, and liability
defense in Mexico since Mexican law permits civil or criminal charges
against drivers, uninsured motorist coverage, and rental car proceeds. State
Farm responded with a reservation of rights letter claiming there was a ques-
tion as to whether the accident took place within twenty-five miles of the
boundary of the United States, as required by her policy. Zubiate was de-
nied rental car coverage because of the twenty-five-mile issue.
State Farm denied coverage based on the conclusion formed by its ad-
juster, who took a recorded statement from Zubiate, that the accident oc-
curred 158 kilometers from the border, which is 98.7 miles. Zubiate received
the denial letter forty-five days after the recorded statement took place. On
June 30 State Farm received a letter from Zubiate's attorney stating that
State Farm had erred on the twenty-five-mile border issue. State Farm re-
sponded with a promise to look into the issue again if the attorney could
provide proof. No further correspondence took place between the attorney
and State Farm.
Zubiate filed suit claiming breach of good faith and fair dealing. Shortly
thereafter, State Farm hired an independent investigator to further investi-
gate the Zubiate claim. The investigator interviewed the wrecker service
company and an ambulance service, though not the correct service. The
investigator concluded that the incident occurred more than twenty-five
miles from the border by measuring a wall map with a ruler. Finally, fifteen
months after the accident, State Farm requested that the investigator visit
the site of the accident. The investigator reported that the accident did in
fact take place within the twenty-five-mile coverage range. Two days later,
State Farm's representative testified on deposition that the claims were de-
nied on the ground that the accident occurred more than twenty-five miles
from the point of entry, abandoning the twenty-five-mile-from-the-border ar-
gument. This was the first time in the case that point of entry was men-
tioned. Twenty months after the accident State Farm paid the collision,
personal injury, liability defense costs, and uninsured motorists' claims.
At trial on the bad faith claim, the jury awarded the Zubiates $165,000 in
149. Id. at 618.
150. Id.
151. 808 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
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mental distress damages and $15 million in punitive damages, plus prejudg-
ment interest. The court of appeals affirmed but reduced the punitive dam-
ages to $600,000. The court held that a "cause of action for breach of duty
of good faith and fair dealing will arise when there is no reasonable basis for
denial of a claim or delay in payment or a failure on the part of the insurer to
determine whether there is any reasonable basis for the denial or delay." 152
The court found evidence of bad faith in the fact that State Farm had denied
coverage for more than fifteen months without conducting an on-site investi-
gation and the fact that State Farm relied on the investigator's discussions
with the wrecker and ambulance services, and on the Mexican police report
in denying the claim. 153 The court also recognized that Zubiate contested
State Farm's denial the entire time, suggesting that State Farm had a duty to
investigate those disputes.' 54 Furthermore, the court acknowledged that
State Farm interposed its "'point of entry' " interpretation of the contract
"too late in the 'game.' "155
In Seale v. American Motorist Insurance Co. '5 6 the court of appeals held
that a reasonable basis to deny a claim does not exist simply because the
claimant has not yet incurred the expenses.157 Patricia Seale suffered an on-
the-job injury and made claim to her employer's workers' compensation car-
rier, American Motorist. The carrier referred Seale to Dr. Cloud, who rec-
ommended bariatric treatment for weight gain and other effects resulting
from the work injury. American Motorist refused to authorize the treat-
ment and refrained from investigating whether Seale's weight gain was a
result of the work injury or whether the bariatric treatment was actually
necessary. Seale sued for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
In reversing the summary judgment in favor of the carrier, the appeals
court found a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in the car-
rier's failure to investigate the propriety of the claim.'5 8 The court reasoned
that unreasonable denial of necessary but unincurred medical expenses
would cause additional financial burden on the injured. '59 Doctors would be
reluctant to render medical assistance to an injured covered under a work-
ers' compensation policy because they could not be certain whether the car-
rier would choose to contest the services based on necessity and/or
reasonableness of charges.16°
In Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford Connecticut v. Davila 16, the
court of appeals upheld a jury verdict finding breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing due to lack of a reasonable basis for denial of the Davi-
152. Id. at 597.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 598.
155. Id.
156. 798 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ denied).
157. Id. at 903
158. Id. at 389.
159. Id. at 390.
160. Id. at 389.
161. 805 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). For full discussion of
the facts see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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las' claim as a result of a house fire. 162 Fire broke out in an upstairs closet
while the Davilas were contending with police after a domestic dispute.
Donna Davila immediately accused her husband of starting the fire. Auto-
mobile Insurance denied the claim based on arson.
The insurer argued it had a reasonable basis for believing David Davila
started the fire based on Donna Davila's initial accusation. The court dis-
agreed and charged the insurer with failure to investigate the matter to de-
termine whether there was a reasonable basis for denying payment based on
the accusation of arson.' 63 The evidence showed that the fire started in the
upstairs closet which contained wiring for the bathroom whirlpool. The
most intense charring from the fire was around the wiring. Still, the insurer
never investigated the wiring. Also, the court found it implausible to suspect
that David had started the fire with the police on the scene and while down-
stairs. 64 The court held the jury could have inferred that arson was
impossible. 165
The court in Commonwealth Lloyd's Insurance Co. v. Thomas 166 upheld
the jury determination of lack of reasonable basis. Fire destroyed the
Thomas house on February 2, 1981, while the Thomas' were out of the
country. On May 4, 1981, Commonwealth denied payment on the basis of
arson. Thomas brought suit for breach of contract. The jury found for
Thomas and the court of appeals affirmed. 167
After the Texas supreme court rendered the Arnold decision, Thomas
sued Commonwealth for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. The
jury found for Thomas again and the trial court awarded $708,800 in actual
damages, $2,000,001 in exemplary damages, and $1,000,637.60 in prejudg-
ment interest.' 68
Commonwealth argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the
jury verdict and damages. The court concluded from Arnold that the trier of
fact determines the reasonableness of the basis for denial or delay in payment
and whether the insurer knew or should have known there was no reason-
able basis. 169 Furthermore, a jury finding can be set aside only when it is "so
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that it is clearly wrong
and unjust."' 70 The court found the jury findings supported by testimony
offered by Thomas' expert fire investigator, who reported that Common-
wealth's own investigation failed to identify the origin of the fire and, there-
fore, Commonwealth could have no reasonable basis for claiming arson. 7
The court held that testimony that Commonwealth's agent neglected to
162. Id. at 903.
163. Id. at 905.
164. Id. at 906.
165. Id.
166. No. 05-90-00785-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas, Jan. 15, 1992).
167. Commonwealth Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 678 S.W.2d 278, 282 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
168. Commonwealth Lloyd's Ins. Co., No. 05-90-00785-CV at 2.
169. Id. at 15 (citing Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167).
170. Id. at 14. (citing Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam)).
171. Id. at 59.
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tell Thomas the correct procedure in submitting claims was more evidence
of breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. 172 Given this and expert
testimony controverting arson, the court concluded the jury could infer lack
of a reasonable basis for denial. 17 3
In Beacon National Insurance Co. v. Reynolds 1 74 Beacon denied Reynolds'
claim for two stolen four-wheelers. Reynolds sued for breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing. The trial court entered judgment in favor of
Reynolds. 175
The court of appeals upheld the jury verdict, finding that Beacon had vio-
lated its duty of good faith and fair dealing. 176 The court relied on evidence
that the company denied the claim without investigation and that no attempt
was made to determine if the four wheelers were licensed as motor vehicles
or farm equipment. 1 77 Beacon offered a letter at trial from an attorney who
opined that case law would support excluding a four-wheeler from a home-
owner's policy because it was a motor vehicle. The court held Beacon acted
in bad faith in denying the claim before it requested and relied upon legal
advice that the four-wheeler was a motor vehicle.17 8 Furthermore, Reynolds
did not receive any information regarding the denial of this claim until after
he requested it.
D. Statute of Limitations
In Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc. 179 the Texas supreme court held
that the statute of limitations on an action for breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing accrues on the date of wrongful delay or denial of
payment.18 0 Several decisions have been handed down within the last year
expanding and interpreting the Murray holding. For example, in Liberty
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Richardsl8 1 the court of appeals held that
Murray applies retroactively. 82 Liberty Mutual terminated Richards'
workers' compensation benefits without reason on January 12, 1983. Rich-
ards sued Liberty Mutual for breach of contract and was granted final judg-
ment on April 30, 1986, with an award of $80,000 compensatory damages
and $3.5 million in punitive damages. On March 7, 1986, she sued Liberty
for bad faith. While this case was pending, the supreme court decided Ar-
nold, holding that the two-year statute of limitations begins to run on an
action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing when the contract
claims have been fully resolved.' 83
172. Id. at 16.
173. Id. at 17.
174. 799 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).
175. Id. at 398.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 14.
179. 800 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. 1990).
180. Id. at 830.
181. 810 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
182. Id. at 234.
183. Id. at 233 (citing Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 168).
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The court of appeals reversed. The court recognized that Murray modi-
fied Arnold in holding that the cause of action for breach of good faith and
fair dealing accrues when the injury is incurred, which is when the claim is
denied and/or delayed and not the date the underlying contract claims are
resolved.' 84 Since the general rule is that a supreme court decision is retro-
active and since there was no indication in the opinion to the contrary, the
court held that Murray controlled Richards' cause of action, which was
therefore barred by limitations as a matter of law. 185
The court of appeals in Commonwealth Lloyd's Insurance Co. v.
Thomas 18 6 explored how the statute of limitations accrues on bad faith
claims. Commonwealth denied payment to Thomas, alleging arson.
Thomas sued on bad faith claims and Commonwealth argued the claim was
barred by limitations.
On appeal, the court rejected Commonwealth's contention that the statute
of limitations barred the claim. 187 Commonwealth relied on Murray in find-
ing the suit barred, since Commonwealth denied the claim in 1981 and the
Thomases filed suit in 1987.188 The court of appeals conceded that Thomas
had filed suit after the applicable statute of limitations, but because Com-
monwealth did not file its amended motion for judgment n.o.v. within thirty
days after the judgment was signed, its amended motion regarding the stat-
ute of limitations was void.' 8 9
Next, the court rejected the argument that Arnold should not be applied
retroactively. The court relied on Sanchez v. Schindler, holding that retroac-
tivity depends on the extent of public reliance on the former rule and the
foreseeability of the change in the law. 190 The court reasoned that reliance is
not an issue since insurers who act in good faith never need to rely on an
action for bad faith. 191 The court also held the Arnold decision foreseeable
in that many other jurisdictions had already recognized a cause of action for
breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing.192 The court of appeals con-
sidered whether courts could administer the Arnold rule without retroactive
application and whether retroactive application would burden court effi-
ciency. It concluded that the Murray modification to the limitation rule
greatly reduces the negative effect retroactive application of Arnold might
have. 193 Finally, the court justified retroactivity of Arnold since holding
otherwise "'favor[s] shielding a party from liability for bad faith.' '194
184. Id. at 234.
185. Id. (citing Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex. 1983)).
186. Commonwealth Ins. Co., No. 05-90-00785. For full discussion of facts see supra note
166 and accompanying text.
187. Id. at 7.
188. Id. (citing Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. 1990)).
189. Id. at 9.
190. Id. at 11 (citing Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex. 1983)).
191. Id.
192. Id.




Beacon National Insurance Co. v. Reynolds 195 defined the extent of limita-
tions in a bad faith claim where the issue involved the identity of the specifi-
cally liable carrier. The carrier was a member of an insurance group
whereby each company issued policies. Defendant argued plaintiff identified
the wrong carrier in the initial pleadings. The court of appeals relied on the
supreme court holding in Enserch Corp. v. Parker that indicated the statute
of limitations is tolled when parties have "intentionally confusing identities
and close ties," even though no party was injured by the confusion. 196 Bea-
con's cause of action was not barred by limitations even though outside the
two-year period.
In Tectonic Realty Investment Co. v. CNA Lloyd's of Texas Insurance
Co. 197 the court of appeals dealt with the difficulties in determining the date
of accrual under Murray.198 Fire destroyed TRICO's condominium project
on July 5, 1984. CNA tentatively agreed that the cash value of the loss was
$973,929. CNA declined to pay the total loss in a lump sum, but instead
offered to advance $650,000 on September 26, 1984, and the remainder as
repairs were made. TRICO accepted the $650,000 and submitted a proof of
loss (which reduced the deductible and payments already made from the
agreed loss value).
TRICO then requested immediate payment of $282,483, the difference be-
tween the proof of loss and the $650,000 advance. TRICO's adjuster wrote
CNA on November 1, 1984, contending CNA had no right to withhold pay-
ment pending repairs or audit of repairs. CNA responded on January 18,
1985, claiming that it did not deny coverage but was merely deferring pay-
ment until repairs were made or audited.
TRICO's attorney then sent a demand letter to CNA, threatening suit.
On April 2, 1985, the first lien holder foreclosed on the property. On Au-
gust 27, 1985, CNA paid $380,000 into the court registry and interpled
TRICO, the first lien holder, and others. TRICO filed a counterclaim
against CNA on March 20, 1987, alleging breach of duty of good faith and
fair dealing.
The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment dismissing the bad
faith claim on limitations. The court held the claim accrued when TRICO
received CNA's January 18, 1985, letter. The court reasoned that TRICO's
February 9, 1985, letter to CNA showed that TRICO knew it had a cause of
action as a result of bad faith. 199
The court recognized the problems in determining the accrual date in situ-
ations involving delay in payment. It stated:
Insurance companies generally do not pay claims the day after the loss
occurs. Even when the insurance carrier does not challenge its liability,
the company will want an adjuster to investigate the claim and calculate
195. 799 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).
196. Id. at 395-96 (citing Ensearch Corp. v. Parker, 794 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. 1990)).
197. 812 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
198. Id. at 652.
199. Id. at 653.
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the loss. Once the adjuster or a claims analyst has confirmed the value
of the claim, the company may still take a reasonable time to pay with-
out giving the insured a cause of action. 20°
The court referred to Murray's recognition of "string[ing]" an insured but
found no evidence that TRICO was strung out since CNA did not continu-
ously promise to pay if TRICO remained patient.20' The court explained
that, as a matter of public policy, the insurer should not deny coverage and
then wait weeks to inform the insured of the denial.202 "Unreasonableness"
with regard to delay in payment is the point at which the insured learns of
the facts that would put a reasonable insured on notice of bad faith. 20 3 The
court concluded that a cause of action will normally accrue on the date the
insured received a denial of coverage notice.20 4
E. Remedies
1. Punitive Damages
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip20 5 the United States
Supreme Court set objective criteria for procedural protections in awarding
punitive damages. 20 6 Lemmie Ruffin, agent for Pacific Mutual, misappropri-
ated insurance premiums remitted for health and life insurance by employees
of Roosevelt City, including Haslip. As a result, the health coverage lapsed
and notices were forwarded to Ruffin, though not to the insureds. Haslip
discovered the errors when she incurred medical expenses but was denied
coverage. Haslip sued Ruffin for fraud and Pacific Mutual under the theory
of respondeat superior. The jury awarded $1 million against the defendants,
which included punitive damages exceeding four times the amount of com-
pensatory damages. The state courts upheld the award and the United
States Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Pacific Mutual's due process
challenge. 20 7
Pacific Mutual argued that Ruffin acted individually and not within his
authority as agent. As a result, the punitive damages were improperly fo-
cused on Pacific Mutual's financial status and not Ruffin's. 20 8 The Court
upheld the jury finding that Ruffin acted as an employee, stating it was sup-
ported by the record. 20 9 The Court reasoned that imposing punitive dam-
ages under the theory of respondeat superior minimizes fraud by creating
incentive for the insurer to control the agent.210
200. Id. at 652.
201. Id. at 653 (citing Murray, 800 S.W.2d at 828, note 2).
202. Id. at 3.
203. Id. at 652.
204. Id. at 653.
205. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
206. See Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1377, 1385 (5th Cir. 1991).
207. Id. at 1035.
208. Id.
209. 111 S. Ct. at 1041. The agent had actual authority to sell the life insurance policies.
He worked out of Pacific Mutual's branch office and corresponded on Pacific Mutual's letter-
head for both life and health policies. I I I S. Ct. at 1040.
210. 111 S. Ct. at 1041.
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The Court held that the punitive damages in this case did not violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 211 Recognizing the de-
terrent and retributive purposes in awarding such damages, the Court admit-
ted that the instructions gave the jury significant but not unlimited
discretion.2 12 The jury award was reviewed by the trial court in a post ver-
dict hearing, where the Court balanced the amount of the award as com-
pared to the goals of deterrence and retribution. 2 13 The Supreme Court
found further procedural protection when the state supreme court reviewed
the award and found that it was reasonable in light of its possible deterrent
effect. 214
In Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Insurance Co. 2 1 5 the Fifth Circuit recently
addressed the constitutional issues of punitive damages in light of Haslip.
Eichenseer was hospitalized with acute pelvic inflammatory disease and un-
derwent a complete hysterectomy. She made a claim for $67,000 in medical
bills to Reserve on a medical policy effective only eighteen days before her
hospitalization. Reserve denied the claim, arguing that it was a preexisting
illness, since Eichenseer's doctor noted that she had been experiencing pain
during the prior two or three years. Reserve's defense for denial was reli-
ance on the doctor's notes without any actual conversations with the doctor
or any Reserve in-house physicians.
Reserve requested medical records, but lost the first set. Eichenseer sent a
second set, but Reserve did not acknowledge receipt of them for two months.
A Reserve employee told Eichenseer that the claim would not be paid until
the doctor altered the medical records to clarify the length of symptoms.
The doctor refused, believing it to be ethically prohibited, but he did agree to
sign an affidavit that admits the patient had only suffered abdominal pains
for two or three days, not years. Reserve received this affidavit, but claimed
to have lost it.
Eichenseer demanded payment or an explanation. Two years after hospi-
talization, Eichenseer received a letter from Reserve, reaffirming its denial
and basing that decision on the doctor's failure to correct the hospital
records. Three years and three months after her initial request for payment,
Reserve paid the claim. Eichenseer sued for contractual and extracontrac-
tual damages.
The trial court awarded $1,000 compensatory damages and $500,000 in
punitive damages. Upon original consideration, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the punitive damages award. 21 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration in light of
211. Id. at 1044.
212. Id.. The instructions explain the deterrent purpose of punitive damages and the dis-
cretion the jury maintains in considering the amount of the award. Id. at 1037, n. i.
213. Id. at 1045.
214. Id. at 1046.
215. 934 F.2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1991). Although this case arose in Mississippi, it is relevant
to Texas law since the court decided it under federal due process standards in light of Haslip.




Again, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the punitive damages award. 218 The
court held that under Haslip punitive damages are constitutional "if the cir-
cumstances of the case indicate that the award is reasonable and the proce-
dure used in assessing and reviewing the award imposes a sufficiently definite
and meaningful constraint on the discretion of the factfinder. ' '219 The court
stated that under Haslip the amount of the award as compared to the
amount of compensatory damages is not dispositive in determining constitu-
tionality of the award, but instead serves as a relevant factor to be
considered. 220
The circumstances of the case create a narrow scope of review by which
the appellate courts are to assess the reasonableness of the punitive damage
award. The court stated that it is not the court's position to opine on the
amount of the award, but instead "the court may only consider whether the
circumstances of the case offer some support for the amount of the
award. '221 The court stated
If there are any circumstances of probative force that support the
amount of the award, then the award meets the "reasonableness" prong
of the due process test in Haslip.222
The court concluded that Reserve's conduct in failing to interview the
doctor, submit the claim to its own in-house physician, and respond to
Eichenseer's attempt to activate a more thorough investigation, including
competent clerical upkeep of records, was egregious and a significant factor
that supported the award for punitive damages.223 The court also held con-
sideration of Reserve's net worth of more than $150 million was necessary to
reach an award that achieves deterrence for future misconduct. 224 Finally,
the court reflected on a previous punitive damage award of $150,000 against
Reserve for similar conduct.225 The court held that this information is prob-
ably most relevant in assessing the proper amount of punitive damages since
the previous amount did not effectively deter such conduct. 226 Though Re-
serve argued the award unconstitutional per se because it was a 500 to one
ratio of the compensatory damages, the court held the damages reasonable
considering the evidence. 227
The court reviewed the procedural safeguards implemented to control the
discretion of the factfinder, including comprehensive jury instructions ex-
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1381-82.
219. Id. at 1382.
220. 934 F.2d at 1382.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1383.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1384. The previous case involved an incident where Reserve failed to inyesti-
gate the medical history of the insured before it issued a policy and then denied a claim under
the policy. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. McGee, 444 So.2d 803 (Miss. 1983).
226. 934 F.2d at 1384.
227. Id. at 1382.
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plaining the nature and purpose of punitive damages, state laws limiting the
amount and applicability of punitive damages, and forms of appellate re-
view.228 The court found the procedural safeguards afforded under Missis-
sippi law adequate to support the award in this case.2 29 Mississippi limits
the amount to that which is necessary for effective specific punishment and
deterrence, as well as is a warning to other tortfeasors. 23 0 Mississippi courts
also consider the financial worth of the defendant and the nature of the in-
jury. 231 The court concluded that these criteria imposed by Mississippi law
were sufficient in limiting the discretion of the court in the present case.2 32
The court did find it significant that the award was given in a bench trial
rather than by a jury. 2 3 3 Still, the court stated that the fact the award was
from the bench did not in itself support constitutionality, but instead af-
forded even more procedural safeguards since the court was required to ex-
plain in detail the basis for the award. 234
In State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Zubiate2 3 5 the court of appeals
allowed the jury to consider evidence of the insurer's net worth in awarding
punitive damages.236 State Farm denied coverage for an automobile acci-
dent that occurred within the Mexican border. The court of appeals upheld
the jury verdict, finding State Farm negligent in its investigation of the acci-
dent.237 The court reflected on the evidence that State Farm denied cover-
age for over fifteen months without conducting an on-site investigation and
despite Zubiate's continuing protest of the denial.238 The court also recog-
nized that State Farm changed its initial interpretation of the policy provi-
sion excluding coverage on accidents outside twenty-five miles of the border
to a "point-of-entry" angle. 239 The court of appeals held that this evidence
was sufficient to support punitive damages. 24 0
The court rejected State Farm's assertion that introduction of evidence of
net worth violated constitutional due process, equal protection, and fair trial
rights.241 The court instead held that evidence of net worth was proper in
determining the amount necessary to produce a deterrent effect.242 Citing
Haslip the court did not find a due process violation since the jury was ap-
propriately instructed on the intent and purpose of punitive damages, and
the trial court conducted a post verdict hearing.243 The court concluded
228. Id. at 1385.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 934 F.2d at 1385.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at n. 13.
235. 808 S.W.2d at 590 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).





241. Id. at 602.
242. Id. at 602-603 (citing Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1988); Farah Mfg.
Co. v. Alvarado, 763 S.W.2d 529, 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1988, affirmed)).
243. Id. at 603, (citing Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d I
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that the $15 million award was not unconstitutionally excessive or in viola-
tion of due process since the jury was instructed to consider many factors in
determining the amount.2 "
The court next determined, however, that the evidence was factually in-
sufficient to support so large an award. The court suggested a remittitur that
would reduce the award to $660,000.245 In response to why the evidence
was not sufficient to support the $15 million jury award, the court said:
"[b]ecause it just is. ' '246
In Automobile Insurance Co. v. Davila247 the court of appeals upheld the
jury verdict of breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing but overturned
its award for exemplary damages. 248 The court of appeals upheld the finding
of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing based on evidence that
the insurer neglected to investigate the point of origin of a fire, even though
arson was suspected. 249 Furthermore, there was evidence negating arson
that the insurer could have found in a proper investigation. Also, the court
held that since the insured was downstairs at the time of the fire, which was
upstairs, the jury was justified in cotcluding that the insured could not have
started the fire.250
The court concluded this same evidence insufficient, however, to show the
insurer acted with a conscious indifference to support exemplary dam-
ages. 25' The court cited an example in Underwriters Life Insurance Co. v.
Cobb 252 where it found the insurer's denial based on a cursory investigation
sufficient to support exemplary damages since there were clear indications of
agent misdealings and the insurer either performed a negligent investigation
or ignored the result of the investigation. 253 The court did not equate Auto-
mobile Insurance's denial to conscious indifference, as demonstrated in
Cobb.254 It held that none of the evidence in the Davila case indicated that
the insurer knew its denial was false when it denied the claim, explaining the
reasoning behind the court's finding that the insurer lack conscious indiffer-
(199 1) (upholding four-to-one ratio of punitive damages to contract damages against due pro-
cess arguments)).
244. Id. at 604. The jury considered:
(1) The nature of the wrong;
(2) The frequency of the wrongs committed;
(3) The character of the conduct involved;
(4) The degree of culpability of the wrongdoer;
(5) The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned;
(6) The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and
propriety; and
(7) The size of an award needed to deter similar wrongs in the future. Id.
245. Id. at 606.
246. Id. at 605.
247. 805 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). For full discussion of
the facts see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
248. Id. at 909.
249. Id. at 904.
250. Id. at 906.
251. Id. at 911.
252. 746 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).




ence necessary to support punitive damages. 255
In Commonwealth Lloyd's Insurance Co. v. Thomas2 56 the court of ap-
peals found evidence supporting the jury award of more than $2 million in
punitive damages.257 Commonwealth denied the Thomases' claim as a re-
sult of a fire that destroyed their house, alleging arson. The court held Com-
monwealth's inadequate investigation evidenced conscious indifference
because it focused only on leads consistent with arson and neglected to dis-
close suspicions of arson to the insured for his own defense.258 The court
overruled Commonwealth's contention that the punitive damages were ex-
cessive, deprived it of property without due process of law, and violated the
"excessive fines" provision of the Texas Constitution.259 The court found
the ratio of exemplary to actual damages, three to one, proportionate.
260
Nor did the amount of damages violate due process since the jury was prop-
erly instructed to consider the deterrent purpose of the damages.
26
'
In Transportation Insurance Co. v. Morie1262 Moriel won an award from
the Industrial Accident Board (IAB). The company appealed the award to
the trial court and Moriel counterclaimed for the medical expenses. Prior to
this, the trial court entered a partial judgment based upon a settlement
agreement. 26 3 The judgment indicated that the medical expenses were un-
certain, but any liability arising from bad faith is excluded from the agree-
ment of uncertainty. 264 The final judgment included a jury award for Moriel
of $101,000 compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages.265
Transportation appealed the punitive damage award, claiming the agreed
settlement found the liability for medical expenses uncertain and that failure
to pay those "uncertain" expenses cannot constitute heedless and reckless
conduct. The court of appeals rejected this contention, noting that the "un-
certainty" language appeared in the "preamble" portion of the judgment and
is controlled by the "decretal" portion of the judgment. 266 Furthermore,
evidence showed that the partial judgment excluded bad faith claims from
the uncertainty provision, and there was no evidence that Moriel agreed to
255. Id.
256. No. 05-90-00785-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas, Sept. 13, 1991, no writ) (not designed for
publication). For full discussion of facts see supra note 166 and accompanying text.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 25.
259. TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 13, 19.
260. Commonwealth, No. 05-90-00785-CV at 27 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins Co. v. Haslip,
Il1 S. Ct. 1032, 1044 (1991)).
261. Id. at 28. The instructions to the jury were "'Exemplary damages' means a discre-
tionary amount awarded to the Plaintiffs that punishes the Defendant and serves as a warning
to others situated like the Defendant to avoid committing like offenses or wrongs in the fu-
ture." Id. at 27.
262. 814 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App.-El 'aso 1991, no writ).
263. Id. at 145.
264. Id. The partial trial court judgment read: "[a]nd it appearing to the Court that the
extent of the injury and liability for compensation or medical expenses are uncertain and that
under the agreement of settlement, Plaintiff Transportation Insurance Company, is to





the uncertainty of Transportation's liability.26 7
The court held that the jury could have inferred heedless and reckless
conduct from evidence showing that the insurance company believed the na-
ture of the injury (impotence) would dissuade litigation and, as a result,
made a conscious decision to implement inconsistent and delayed action re-
garding the claim. 268 The carrier delayed payment of claims for a period of
years and required letters from Moriel's doctors, confirming the necessity of
treatment and testing for sleep disorders and impotency.
Citing Haslip, the court rejected the argument that the punitive damage
award violated federal and state constitutions. 269 The court held that the
jury was properly given guidelines by which to assess punitive damages such
as: the nature of the wrong, the character of the conduct involved, the de-
gree of culpability of the wrongdoer, the situation and sensibilities of the
parties, the extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice
and propriety, the frequency of the wrong committed, and the size of the
award necessary to deter similar wrongs in the future.270
2. Mental Anguish
The court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Zubiate271
upheld mental anguish damages. 272 State Farm denied Zubiate's claim
based on a policy exclusion of accidents that occur within twenty-five miles
of the Mexican border. State Farm also denied a defense in Zubiate's crimi-
nal prosecution in Mexico. Payment of Zubiate's claim was delayed for
more than fifteen months. State Farm argued on appeal that the evidence
did not support mental anguish damages since there was no evidence of
physical manifestations.
Relying on St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard, the Zubiate court held that
proof of physical manifestations is not required to recover for negligent in-
fliction of mental anguish.273 The court conceded that the accepted stan-
dard of recovery for mental anguish demanded that the plaintiff prove more
than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment or anger.274 The court
recognized that part of the proof of mental anguish includes the witnesses'
demeanor, voice modulation, and feelings they project to the jurors.2 75 The
court also recognized that the evidence of events in the plaintiff's life as a
267. Id at 146.
268. Id. at 148.
269. Id. at 149.
270. Id. at 150.
271. 808 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). For full discussion of facts
see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
272. Id. at 599 (citing St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tex. 1987)).
273. Id. (citing Town East Ford Sales v. Gray, 730 S.W.2d 796, 803-804 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1987, no writ); Ryder Truck Rentals v. Latham, 593 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
274. Id. at 599-600 (citing Herbert v. Herbert, 754 S.W.2d 141, 147 (Tex. 1988)).
275. Id. at 600 (citing City of Ingleside v. Kneuper, 768 S.W.2d 451, 460 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1989, writ denied)).
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result of the injury is equally important.276
Zubiate testified that she felt intimidated, confused, frightened, angry,
scared, and devastated by the treatment she received from State Farm. She
detailed the trouble she had in appearing frequently in Mexico to contend
with the criminal charges. Zubiate's husband testified about the economic
harm caused by State Farm's denial, including damage to his credit when he
stopped making payments on the wrecked vehicle. Other testimony showed
that the State Farm representative demanded that Mr. Zubiate obtain a copy
of the Mexican police report, while State Farm later obtained a copy but
refused to provide a copy to the insureds.
The court concluded that, given the existence of mental anguish, there are
no objective facts by which to quantify that anguish.277 The court held that
much discretion must be given to the jurors and that no court is free to
replace the jury award. 278
The court of appeals upheld a jury award of damages for emotional dis-
tress in Davila.279 The insurer denied Davila's claim based on Mrs. Davila's
initial accusation that her husband started the house fire. The trial court
and court of appeals found evidence supporting a breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing since the insurer did not investigate the incident to
determine how the fire actually occurred. 280 The Davilas did not testify as
to their emotions or mental distress as a result of the denial. Nor was there
any other form of direct evidence supporting damages for mental anguish.
The court of appeals held that circumstantial evidence supported the
award of $20,000 each for past mental anguish suffered as a result of the
denial of the claim.2 1 The court recognized that the emotional distress
found by the jury would have to be inferred from the unrepaired condition of
the house and the Davila's shortage of clothes and furniture since they were
unable to replace them without insurance coverage. 28 2 Mr. Davila testified
that they were forced to live in the downstairs part of the house. Mrs. Da-
vila testified that they were without clothing for five months after the fire.
They both testified to incurring large telephone bills in efforts to procure
cooperation with the insurer. The court also relied on evidence that the
Davilas were of the sort to react with intense emotions to events. 28 3 Yet, the
court did not find evidence to support the award of future mental anguish
damages.284
In Commonwealth Lloyd's Insurance Co. v. Thomas the court of appeals
held that evidence of loss of business and credibility with business associates,
as well as deteriorative living conditions, supported the jury's award for
276. Id. at 601.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford Conn., v. Davila 805 S.W.2d 897, 907. For full
discussion of the facts see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
280. Id. at 907.
281. Id. at 908.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 907.
284. Id. at 908.
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mental anguish damages. 28 5 Thomas testified that the local newspaper cov-
ered the fire that burned his house and that business associates were aware of
the arson accusations. This, in turn, affected his ability to borrow money to
facilitate the Thomases' real estate and home building businesses. Having
moved from their home to a hotel apartment and then, ultimately, into a
travel trailer caused stressful living conditions. The court also considered
Commonwealth's direct contacts with the Thomases in upholding damages
for mental anguish.286
3. Prejudgment Interest
In Potomac Insurance Co. v. Howard 287 Potomac issued an insurance pol-
icy to Howard with uninsured motorists policy limits of $45,000. Howard
sued Potomac for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing after she was denied coverage for injuries she sustained from
a hit and run accident. The trial court awarded Howard the policy limits of
$45,000 plus prejudgment interest at the rate of ten percent compounded
daily.
On appeal, Potomac asserted that the trial court award exceeded the pol-
icy limits and was, therefore, improper. Potomac further argued that the
prejudgment interest was for damages and not for the use of money. The
court affirmed the trial court award, holding that "[i]f a judgment provides
plaintiffs only the amount of damages sustained at the time of the incident,
plaintiffs are not fully compensated. '' 28 8 The court reasoned that prejudg-
ment interest promotes quick compensation to victims and ensures that the
plaintiff receives the actual amount of his loss. 28 9
In Commonwealth Lloyd's Insurance Co. v. Thomas the court of appeals
remanded the case solely to recompute the Thomases award of prejudgment
interest, using an arbitrary accrual date of six months after the date of the
incident giving rise to their cause of action. 29° Commonwealth denied cov-
erage for damages caused by a house fire, alleging arson. Thomas sued for
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court of appeals up-
held the jury verdict for Thomas. 291
The court held that prejudgment interest damages are allowed to compen-
sate the plaintiff for the loss of the available use of money from the time of
injury to the date of judgment. 292 Thomas argued the date of claim denial
was the date of injury. The court relied on Cavnar v. Quality Control Park-
ing, Inc. where the supreme court adopted an arbitrary date of accrual of six
285. Commonwealth Ins. Co., No. 05-90-00785-CV at 19-20. For full discussion of the
facts see supra note 166 and accompanying text.
286. Id.
287. 813 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
288. Id. at 558.
289. Id.
290. Commonwealth Lloyd's Ins. Co., No. 05-90-00785-CV at 30.
291. Commonwealth at 30.
292. Id. at 28.
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months after the incident giving rise to the cause of action.293 In Cavnar the
supreme court reasoned that a system requiring litigants to determine the
precise date when each element of damage was incurred "would impose an
onerous burden on both the trial bench and bar."' 294 Although the Cavnar
court applied this arbitrary method of determining prejudgment interest to
tort actions of wrongful death, personal injury, and survival action, the court
of appeals found Canar's holding compelling and applicable in this case. 295
The court of appeals remanded the case for the sole purpose of recalculating
prejudgment interest, using an accrual date that was six months after the
denial of the claim.296
4. Other
a. Loss of Credit. The court of appeals reversed a jury award for dam-
ages for past and future loss of credit in Automobile Insurance Co. v. Da-
vila 297 The Davilas' house burned, but Automobile Insurance denied their
claim, alleging arson. The Davilas stopped making payments on furniture
purchased on credit before the fire because all their savings went to new
clothing and necessary household repairs. After repeated demands for pay-
ment, the Davilas returned the furniture to the creditor for a credit on the
unpaid balance. There was no evidence of harm to their credit as a result of
the incident, other than Mrs. Davila's testimony that their credit was "to-
tally ruined." The court held that the evidence reflected only a scintilla that
the Davilas suffered credit loss as a result of the insurer's denial.298
b. Loss of Consortium. In Torchia v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 29 9
Torchia accepted $32,500 in exchange for his release of Aetna for any liabil-
ity that arose out of the way Aetna "handled, settled, or defended" any of
Torchia's workers' compensation claims. Eighteen months after the settle-
ment, Torchia sued Aetna for breach of the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing, alleging lack of consideration for the settlement agreement, unilateral
mistake, and disparity in bargaining power. Torchia's wife alleged loss of
consortium resulting from Aetna's negligence in handling her husband's
compensation claim.
Relying on Whittlesey v. Miller, the court recognized that a release by
Torchia could not preclude his wife's claim for loss of consortium. 30 Still,
Torchia's unconditional approval of the final judgment and affidavit con-
firming the uncertainty of Aetna's liability gave Aetna a reasonable basis for
293. Id. at 30 (citing Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.
1985)).
294. Cavnar, 696 S.W.2d at 555.
295. Commonwealth, No. 05-90-00785-CV at 31.
296. Id.
297. 805 S.W.2d at 909. For full discussion of facts see supra note 71 and accompanying
text.
298. Id.
299. 804 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). For full discussion of the
facts see supra note 130 and accompanying text.
300. Id. at 225. (citing Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. 1978)).
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not paying compensation.30 Therefore, neither Torchia nor his wife could
show that Aetna was liable for any injuries sustained by Torchia as a result
of Aetna's refusal to pay compensation.
III. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
A. Standing to Sue
In Employers Casualty Co. v. International Trucking Co. 302 the court of
appeals defined "consumer" with regard to recovery under the DTPA. 30 3 A
truck owned by International collided with a truck owned by Williams Drill-
ing Company. International sued Williams for negligence. International
also sued Williams' insurers, Employers Casualty Co. and Employers Na-
tional Co., and two claims adjusters, Page and Veale, for deceptive trade
practices and unfair insurance practices. International nonsuited Williams.
The claims against Page were based on allegations that she contacted Inter-
national shortly after the accident and instructed the president, Alexander,
to initiate repairs and she would assist in the matter in any way. After com-
pletion of repairs, Veale denied payment as representative of the insurer.
The trial court granted all defendants summary judgment on the unfair
insurance practice claims. 304 The court then granted directed verdicts for
Page and Veale, but the jury found the insurers had knowingly violated the
DTPA and caused damages to International, awarding treble damages. 305
On appeal, the court addressed whether International was a "consumer"
so that it could maintain a cause of action under the DTPA. 3°6 The statute
requires that the claimant sought or acquired goods or services.30 7 Interna-
tional relied on Hermann Hospital v. National Standard Insurance Co. 308 in
arguing it was a consumer of the "settlement services" rendered by Page and
Veale and as an intended beneficiary under the automobile liability policy
owned by Williams. 3°9 In Hermann Hospital the court allowed a hospital to
recover from a patient's insurer for misrepresentations regarding the pa-
tient's coverage. 310 The court rejected the Hermann analogy because it held
the controlling factor in Hermann was the express and direct relationship
the insurer had with a health care provider.31
301. Id.
302. No. 04-90-0O012-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio, June 26, 1991).
303. Id. at 132.
304. Id. at 131.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 132. See also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987) ("con-
sumer" is "an individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a subdivision or agency of this
state who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services, except that the term
does not include a business consumer that has assets of $25 million or more, or that is owned
or controlled by a corporation or entity with assets of $25 million or more").
307. Id. at 133 (citing Hi-Line Elec. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 587 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1979), writ ref'd per curiam, 593 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1980)).
308. 776 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
309. Employers Casualty Co., No. 04-90-00012-CV at 134-136.
310. Hermann Hosp., 776 S.W.2d at 253.
311. Employers Casualty Co., No. 04-90-00012-CV at 135.
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The court recognized that Texas law finds an injured party to be a third-
party beneficiary, but that party cannot enforce the policy directly against
the insurer until the insured's legal obligation to pay damages to the injured
party has been established by judgment or agreement. 312 The court con-
cluded that International lacked standing to sue as a consumer under the




In State Farm County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Moran314 the insured de-
nied Moran's claim for uninsured motorist benefits, arguing that Moran as-
sumed the risk of incurring damages when he allowed his nephew to tow his
truck by attaching a chain between the two vehicles. Moran sued under the
DTPA, alleging that when he initially purchased the policy State Farm mis-
represented the extent of coverage when referring to it as "full coverage."
On appeal, the court agreed with State Farm that the evidence did not
support a jury finding that State Farm had violated the DTPA. The court
determined that State Farm made no misrepresentation when it told Moran
he had "full coverage" under the policy. 315 The court concluded that State
Farm's representation was a term of art used in the insurance industry to
describe a level of insurance coverage. 316 Therefore, Moran did not receive
anything less than a full coverage policy as represented by State Farm.31 7
2. Recovery Allowed
In Weyant v. Acceptance Insurance Co.3 18 the Weyants purchased cargo,
liability, and collision insurance on their flatbed truck from Acceptance (out-
of-state insurer) through Southwestern (independent surplus lines agent).
Acceptance had authority to provide insurance in Texas through Southwest-
312. Id. at 136 (relying on Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Murray, 437 S.W.2d 264, 265 (Tex. 1969)
(established injured as third-party beneficiary) and State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ollis,
768 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1989) (insured's liability must be established)).
313. Id. at 137. International also brought causes of action under article 21.21 of the Texas
Insurance Code. The court used the same analysis, requiring that International qualify as a
consumer to have standing to sue. Article 21.21 does not require the injured be a consumer
but merely a "person". While the DTPA and article 21.21 overlap in granting the same cause
of action for the same types of conduct, excluding unconscionability and breach of warranty
under the DTPA, article 21.21 is more expansive because it offers actionability on the claims to
anyone who has suffered damages. See 10 TCLR 206, Sept. 1991.
314. 809 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). For full discussion of
facts see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
315. Id. at 621.
316. Id.
317. Id. But see Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Tex. 1980) (holding that
misrepresentations of material fact not the result of "puffing" or opinion are actionable under
the DTPA even though they may be broad descriptions);
318. 917 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1990).
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ern from article 1.14-2 of the Texas Insurance Code.3 19 Mr. Weyant asked
Southwestern to cancel his policies. Southwestern, in turn, forwarded no-
tices of cancellation. Weyant then requested that the unearned premiums on
the cancelled cargo and liability policies be applied to "save" the collision
policy. Southwestern instructed Weyant to disregard the cancellation notice
on the collision policy, but never forwarded a written endorsement. Later,
Weyant filed a claim for damages to the flatbed. Acceptance denied the
claim, asserting that the policy had lapsed. Two days later, Weyant received
a check from Southwestern representing a refund of the unearned premiums
from the three policies. Weyant sued Acceptance, alleging misrepresenta-
tions in violation of the DTPA.
The trial court held that since Southwestern never received written ap-
proval from Acceptance to reinstate the policy, then it acted outside its con-
tactual and statutory authority.320 The trial court granted summary
judgment for Acceptance. 32 1
The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court found evidence that the agency
agreement between Southwestern and Acceptance specified that Southwest-
ern has discretion in cancelling policies. 322 The court held that Southwest-
ern's reinstatement assurances were actually retractions of notice to cancel
since they were made before the effective date of cancellation. 323 Further-
more, the trier of fact could infer the implied or apparent authority to retract
a cancellation from the express authority to cancel a policy. 324
The court then considered Southwestern's statutory authority as a surplus
lines agent. The court held that neither article 1.14-2 nor the agency con-
tract specifically determined Southwestern's authority as surplus line
agent. 325 The court found the present situation similar to other cases dealing
with the scope of a surplus lines agent's duties. In Bellefonte Underwriters
Insurance Co. v. Brown the court of appeals found a principal-agent relation-
ship between the surplus line agent and the unauthorized insurer based on
evidence that the surplus line insurer assisted in the risk evaluation of the
insured, provided policy forms, collected premiums, and delivered the poli-
cies to the insureds. 326 In Foundation Reserve Insurance Co. v. Wesson an-
319. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.14-2 (Vernon 1987) (unauthorized insurer may provide
insurance in Texas through licensed independent surplus line insurer).
320. Id. at 212 (contract between Acceptance and Southwestern requires specific approval
for agent authorization of changes); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art 1.14-2, § 6(d) (surplus line
agent must obtain written approval from surplus line insurer to reinstate policy) and 6(e)
(requires written document evidencing any change made to surplus line policy).
321. Id. at 209.
322. Weyant, 917 F.2d at 212. The agreement states: "The Agent shall not obligate the
Company beyond the limitations set forth herein or as specified in instructions issued by the
Company, either orally or in writing, or alter, modify, waive or change any of the terms, rates
or limitations of the Company's policies .... Id. "[T]o cancel such policies is the discretion of
the Agent, where such cancellation is legally possible .... " Id.
323. Id. (reasoning that it would be impossible to reinstate a policy that had never effec-
tively been cancelled).
324. Id. at 213.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 214 (citing Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brown, 663 S.W.2d 562, 585-86
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ denied)).
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other court of appeals determined that status as a surplus line agent does not
determine the agent's authority.327 The issue of scope of authority must be
determined by all the circumstances. 328 The court concluded that this was a
genuine issue for the trier of fact so that summary judgment was inappropri-




In McLaren v. Imperial Casualty and Indemnity Co. 330 Imperial insured
the City of Bedford, the Bedford Police Department and employees of both.
The policy in question covered damages resulting from "wrongful acts aris-
ing out of Law Enforcement activities. ' 331 Furthermore, the policy specified
that the insurer was obligated to defend the insured only when the claims
were against the insured as a result of acts or omissions during the scope of
employment.
McLaren sued Taylor, a Bedford police officer, for sexual assault. Taylor
notified Imperial of the claim and Imperial denied coverage, arguing the as-
sault was not an activity of law enforcement or within the scope of employ-
ment. 332 Taylor also demanded defense and Imperial refused. McLaren
took a $7,018,045 judgment against Taylor, and later Taylor assigned his
rights against Imperial to McLaren.
McLaren sued Imperial for failure to pay her claims on Taylor's behalf
and failure to defend Taylor. The district court first addressed the issue of
whether Taylor committed the sexual assault during the scope of his em-
ployment. Evidence showed that Taylor was on duty and in his patrol car
during the incident. Still, the court found that Taylor's acts were not in the
furtherance of law enforcement but, instead, were committed for purposes of
personal desires. 333
McLaren argued the defendants were collaterally estopped from question-
ing the existence of scope of employment since she was awarded attorney's
fees when the district court found Taylor acted under the color of state law
at the time of the assault and therefore, acted within the scope of his employ-
ment. The court relied on Hargis v. Maryland American General Insurance
Co. in holding that the issues of the insured's liability and of coverage are
separate, so that prior judgment on liability does not resolve issues of cover-
age.334 Furthermore, the court reasoned that no privity of contract existed
327. Id. (citing Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. v. Wesson, 447 S.W.2d 436, 438 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd)).
328. Foundation, 447 S.W.2d at 438.
329. Weyant, 917 F.2d at 215.
330. 767 F. Supp. 1364 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
331. Id. at 1367.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1371.
334. Id. at 1372 (citing Hargis v. Maryland American, 567 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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between McLaren and Imperial, thus precluding the application of collateral
estoppel. 335
McLaren argued that the duty to defend exists, despite conclusive proof of
lack of coverage. The court rejected the "allegations of complaint" rule
where the duty to defend depends on the allegations of the underlying com-
plaint, whether true or not.336 The court held that such a rule arises when
the insurer refuses to defend on the basis that the insured is not liable.337
Here, the insurer has the duty to defend. The rule is also applicable when
the allegations included facts that fall within an exclusion in the policy. 3 38
The insurer has no duty to defend in this instance. The court concluded that
this case involved allegations of the second category since the liability of
Taylor was not the result of acts committed in the furtherance of his
employment. 339
McLaren argued that Imperial was estopped from claiming an exclusion
from coverage because the policy was not approved by the State Board of
Insurance. The court rejected this argument, holding that there was no evi-
dence the form of the policy was not approved.34 Also, the court reasoned
that denial of coverage was not based on a policy exclusion, but instead was
based on the policy language which limited the extent of coverage.3 41 Fi-
nally, the court could find no damage to Taylor from Imperial's failure to
defend and/or failure to obtain approval over the policy form from the State
Board of Insurance. 342 The court ordered judgment denying recovery to
McLaren on any basis alleged and pleaded. 343
In Balderama v. Western Casualty Life Insurance Co. 344 the Balderamas
purchased accident and sickness insurance from Western. Upon the in-
surer's acceptance, Balderama received four documents, including a copy of
the application, the "Catastrophic Medical Hospital Policy," the "Accident
Policy," and an endorsement. The hospital policy specified no coverage over
newborns, while the accident policy referred to the policy schedule in the
application, which recognized coverage of newborns, including those with
congenital defects.
One year after receiving these documents the Balderamas had a fourth
child. When they claimed for the newborn's medical expenses resultant
from health problems, Western denied, asserting that the newborn was not
covered because she was not named in the application. The Balderamas
sued for breach of contract, negligence, breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing, DTPA violations, and Insurance Code violations.
Specifically, the Balderamas alleged that Western violated article 3.70-
335. 767 F. Supp. at 1372.
336. Id.
337, Id.
338, Id. at 1373.
339. Id.




344. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 46 (Tex. 1991).
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2(E) of the Texas Insurance Code by issuing a single policy that excluded
coverage on congenital defects of newborns.3 4 The district court held that
there were two individual policies and, therefore, the Insurance Code was
not violated. 346 The court of appeals affirmed. 347
The Texas supreme court reversed. 348 Western argued that the docu-
ments constituted two separate policies. Alternatively, Western argued that
even if the documents were viewed as one policy, that one policy provided
two separate coverages. The supreme court disagreed, holding that the "Ac-
cident Policy" could not stand on its own because it lacked the policy sched-
ule.349 Furthermore, the fact that there was a single policy number and a
single monthly premium suggested one policy.350 The court concluded that
the policy violated the Insurance Code since it did not provide the same
extent of coverage for the newborn as it did for the other Balderama
children. 35 1
In Gaulden v. Johnson352 a rear-end collision resulted when Gaulden
slowed to prevent hitting Johnson. Leimer hit Gaulden instead. Gaulden
sued Johnson, uninsured, and Leimer, insured. Gaulden later settled with
Leimer without the consent of Gaulden's insurer, USF&G. Gaulden then
got a, default judgment against Johnson and sought to recover from USF&G
under her uninsured motorist coverage. USF&G denied coverage under a
clause in the policy that refuses uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage
for any insured who settles without the insurer's consent.35 3 USF&G as-
serted that "the claim" referred to any claim against any person, insured or
uninsured, arising out of the accident at issue. According to this interpreta-
tion, Gaulden's settlement with Leimer would prevent Gaulden from collect-
ing on her claim against Johnson. The trial court granted summary
judgment for USF&G. 35 4
The court of appeals reversed, finding the policy ambiguous. 35 5 The court
held that the language was not standard. 356 Furthermore, the language was
included in the section of the policy dealing with an uninsured/underinsured
motorist, which "leads the reader to the logical conclusion that it refers to
claims against those types of motorists.1 357
345. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.70-2(E). This section of the code prohibits issuance of an
accident/sickness policy that covers newborns but limits coverage to a particular time frame or
excludes congenital defects. Coverage for newborns should be to the same extent as coverage
for other applicable children.
346. Balderman, 35 Tex. Sup. St. J. at 46.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 48.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. 801 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
353. Id. at 563. The provision states "[w]e do not provide Uninsured/Underinsured Mo-
torists Coverage for any person .... If that person or the legal representative settles the claim
without our consent." Id.
354. Id. at 562.





USF&G relied on language in the policy giving it subrogation rights and
requiring that the insured do nothing to prejudice those rights. The court
reasoned that USF&G could validly require a right to be subrogated, but
that the language in the policy did not clearly place the insured on notice
that she should not settle with anyone involved in the accident or else forfeit
her right to uninsured coverage. 358
In Upshaw v. Pleasant359 the court of appeals addressed the issue of intra
policy stacking of underinsured motorist coverage. 36° George Upshaw died
as the result of an accident with Pleasant. The decedent had a single multi
vehicle insurance policy issued by Trinity Companies, providing uninsured/
underinsured motorist protection for $20,000 per person and $40,000 per
accident. Trinity tendered $20,000, but Upshaw's executors contended they
were entitled to the $40,000.
During the suit against the driver for negligence and against Trinity, the
executors sought declaratory relief to determine that the unin-
sured/underinsured motorist coverage could be intra-stacked to recover the
$40,000, based on the fact that there were multiple vehicles insured under
one policy. 361 The trial court denied the relief.
The court of appeals rejected the argument that intra-stacking should be
allowed since the policy was ambiguous. 3 62 The court held that the relevant
provisions of the policy have been approved by the State Board of Insurance
and have not been rejected by any court.3 63 Furthermore, the court held
that the legislature intended to provide for two limits of uninsured/ underin-
sured liability, as indicated in article 5.06-1(2)(d) of the Texas Insurance
Code. 364
The court also rejected the argument that public policy mandates intra
stacking. Recognizing the issue as one of first impression, the court held
that the legislature was perfectly clear in the statute that the limits specified
in the policy control the amount of recovery by an underinsured motorist
claimant. 365 Furthermore, review of Texas cases indicated that unless it is
clear from the terms of the policy that an added premium charge to a basic
policy for additional vehicles was for the purpose of increasing the policy
358. Id. at 564-65.
359. 812 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
360. Id. at 354.
361. Id. (" '[s]tacking' refers to the ability of the insured, when covered by more than one
insurance policy, to obtain benefits from a second policy on the same claim when recovery
from the first policy alone would be inadequate. ... 'Intra-policy stacking is the aggregation of
the limits of liability for uninsured-motorist coverage of each car covered in one policy,
whereas inter-policy stacking involves the aggregation of coverage under more than one pol-
icy' "). Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 354.
364. Upshaw, 812 S.W.2d at 355. See also TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1(2)(d) (Vernon
1981) ("total aggregate limit of liability to any one person who sustains bodily injury or prop-
erty damage as the result of any one occurrence shall not exceed the limit of liability for these
coverages as stated in the policy and the total aggregate limit of liability to all claimants, if
more than one, shall not exceed the total limit of liability per occurrence as stated in the policy
.... ).
365. Id. at 356.
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limits, intra-policy stacking will not be permitted, and the limits listed on the
policy will control the maximum amount recovered from any given pol-
icy. 366 The court concluded that intra policy stacking of underinsured mo-
torist coverage is not permissible unless specified within the policy.3 67
The court of appeals considered the issue of whether the surrender of one
life insurance policy can serve as consideration for the issuance of a new
policy in Taylor v. Bonilla.3 68 Scott Taylor had a whole life policy with New
York Life Insurance Co. He met with New York's agent, Bonilla, to discuss
surrendering the policy. During that meeting, Taylor completed and signed
an application for a new term policy and forms to surrender the existing
whole policy for cash value. Bonilla noted on the application that the whole
life policy would terminate when the new term policy was issued. Taylor
never paid a premium on the new policy but did receive and negotiate a
check in full settlement of the claims under the whole life policy before he
was killed in a car wreck. Bonilla informed Mrs. Taylor that her husband
was not covered under either policy.
Mrs. Taylor brought suit claiming breach of contract, breach of fiduciary
duty, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, DTPA violations,
and Insurance Code violations. The trial court granted summary judgment
against Taylor on the term policy contract claim for lack of consideration. 369
The trial court also granted directed verdict against Taylor on the whole life
policy contract claim because the policy had been surrendered. 370 The jury
found for the defendants on the remaining extracontractual claims.
On appeal, the court addressed an issue of first impression, concluding
that Mr. Taylor's surrender of the whole life policy could serve as considera-
tion for the new term policy if there was evidence that Taylor surrendered
the old policy in return for the new policy. 37' The question turned on intent
of the parties. The court held that Bonilla was an interested witness and his
testimony was not proper as the basis for rendition of a summary judg-
ment.372 Since Bonilla's testimony was the only evidence offered by defend-
ants and since defendants did not present evidence to otherwise negate
Taylor's intent that surrender of the whole policy served as consideration for
the term policy, the court reversed the summary judgment.373
The court of appeals next considered the directed verdict on the whole life
policy claim. The plaintiff argued that the surrender of the whole life policy
and the application for the term policy were part of one transaction to avoid
a gap in coverage. The defendants argued that the surrender was uncondi-
tional because the surrender request form indicated the surrender would be
effective immediately. The court of appeals recognized Bonilla's notation on
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. 801 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied).
369. Id. at 557.
370. Id. at 558.
371. Id
372. Id. at 557.
373. 801 S.W.2d at 559.
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the application, that the whole life policy would terminate when the new
policy was issued, as more than a scintilla of evidence of the parties intent.374
The court reasoned that the whole life policy contained an offer to remit
cash upon unconditional surrender of the policy.3 75 Bonilla's notation on
the application could serve as a counteroffer that necessitated a response by
New York Life.376 The court of appeals concluded that this evidence raised
fact issues to be determined by the jury and reversed the directed verdict. 377
B. Policy Exclusions
In General Manufacturing Co. v. CNA Lloyd's 378 the issue on appeal was
whether the general liability policy excluded Rockwall's loss for defective
windows it manufactured, sold, and installed. Rockwall replaced over
10,000 cracked windows at a cost of more than $1.1 million in efforts to
preserve business good will and mitigate damages. Rockwall then filed claim
with CNA for coverage. CNA denied coverage based on the business
risk/products exclusion in the policy which excluded "property damage to
work performed by or on behalf of the named insured arising out of the work
or any portion thereof, or out of materials, parts, or equipment furnished in
connection therewith .... ,,379
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court in holding that the exclu-
sion was properly applied to this situation and that CNA was reasonable in
denying payment.380 The court found the exclusion unambiguous, relying
on previous cases in which the same exclusionary provision had been found
unambiguous.381
The court also rejected Rockwall's argument that it should be allowed to
recover for the diminution in value of the buildings as a result of property
damage caused by the cracking windows. 38 2 The court found no record of
evidence alleging Rockwall liable to third-parties for this diminution of value
and therefore held that no recovery was justified. 383
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Hudson Energy Co. 384 the
supreme court interpreted another policy exclusion.38 5 National Union de-
nied Hudson's claim for damages incurred to his aircraft during a landing,
374. Id. at 560.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 558.
377. Id. at 361.
378. 806 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied). For a full discussion of the
facts see supra 119 and accompanying text.
379. Id. at 299.
380. Id.
381. Id. (citing Bateson Constr. Co. v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co., 784 S.W.2d 692, 694-
95 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Volentine, 578
S.W.2d 501, 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ); Eulich v. Home Indemn. Co.,
503 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
382. Id. at 299-300.
383. Id. at 300.
384. 811 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1991). For a full discussion of the facts of this case see supra
note 79 and accompanying text.
385. Id. at 553.
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arguing that the incident fell within a policy exclusion because both Hudson
and his flight instructor had control over the plane at the time of the acci-
dent. The policy stated that when in flight the plane would be piloted by
Hudson, provided he was a qualified private pilot, or by any other qualified
pilot.386 National Union argued that the policy excluded simultaneous pilot-
ing, meaning piloting by several different people. National Union also ar-
gued that the clause excluded Hudson since evidence at trial demonstrated
that Hudson could not produce a Federal Aviation Administration certifi-
cate confirming private pilot qualifications. Hudson argued that the policy
exclusion was drafted only to ensure that a qualified pilot controlled the
plane.
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's holding in favor of Hudson.
The court held that the exclusion clause was ambiguous and should there-
fore be construed in the light most favorable to the insured. 387 The court
held that an intent to exclude coverage must be written in clear and unam-
biguous language.388 The court concluded that because National Union had
failed to clearly state the exclusion in the policy and Hudson's interpretation
of the exclusion was reasonable, the exclusion should be read in Hudson's
favor, which mandated coverage. 389
In United Services Automobile Association v. Pennington 390 Gary Lochte
ran a quarter horse breeding business with his father. He purchased a quar-
ter horse to test a new racehorse training system. The purchase was made
apart from the breeding business. Lochte and a friend ran an advertisement
for a beginner jockey to test the horse. Penny Pennington responded and
was injured when the horse fell on top of her, breaking her pelvis.
Pennington sued Lochte. Lochte requested defense from his homeowner's
insurer, USAA. USAA refused to defend, relying on an exclusion in the
policy for business pursuits. The trial court rendered judgment against
Lochte for $277,576.77. Lochte assigned his claims against USAA to Pen-
nington in exchange for her agreement not to execute the judgment against
him personally. Pennington sued USAA. The jury held Lochte's purchase
was not a business pursuit and found USAA breached its duty to defend.
The jury also found USAA grossly negligent in handling Lochte's claim. It
awarded $25,000 for mental anguish, lost wages, and attorney's fees, and
$25,000 as exemplary damages.
On appeal, the court held that Lochte's purchase of the quarter horse was
not a business pursuit. No Texas court has construed the meaning of the
term business pursuit until now. This court defined business pursuit as hav-
ing two elements: "(1) continuity or regularity of the activity; and (2) a
386. Id. at 554.
387. Id. at 555 (citing Barnett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 723 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tex. 1987);
Ramsey v. Maryland Am. Gen. Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. 1984); Brown v. Palatine,
89 Tex. 590, 595, 355 S.W. 1060, 1061 (1896)).
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. 810 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
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profit motive."'391 Lochte's testimony that the horse was a hobby and not
purchased for business, and lack of evidence of any regularity in purchasing
horses for this type of endeavor supported the jury finding that the owner-
ship of the horse was not a business pursuit.392 Although Lochte claimed
depreciation for the horse on his tax return, the court held that the jury was
the final arbiter on the profit motive, and there was evidence to support the
jury finding. 393
USAA argued Pennington could not bring a cause of action for negligent
claims handling since refusal to defend is a breach of a contractual duty.
The court held that in order to find a tort action out of a breach of a contrac-
tual duty the tort action must be independent of the contract. 394 The court
explained that the claim is contractual if the conduct imposes liability only
as a result of the breach of contract. 395 The court reasoned that without the
homeowner's insurance policy there would have been no duty to defend. 396
Therefore, the claim was contractual in nature.397
In S.S. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 398 the Austin court of appeals
distinguished between intentional injury and intentional acts with regard to
policy exclusions.399 S.S. contracted genital herpes from G.W. after having
sex at G.W.'s house. G.W. notified State Farm of S.S.' claim and requested
defense. State Farm agreed to defend but refused to admit liability or cover-
age. G.W. rejected the qualified defense, entered into an agreed judgment
awarding S.S. $1 million, assigned to S.S. all coverage claims against State
Farm, and assigned one-third of any causes action he had for State Farm's
claims handling.
State Farm sought declaratory relief to establish lack of coverage. State
Farm relied on the policy provision excluding coverage for "bodily injury
... caused intentionally by... the Insured" and argued public policy pro-
hibited insurance coverage for negligent transmission of sexual diseases. 400
Alternatively, State Farm claimed it had no obligation to defend or indem-
nify G.W. since he failed to cooperate and engaged in collusion, fraud, and
conspiratorial conduct.
G.W. and S.S. counterclaimed, alleging coverage over the injury and that
State Farm's conduct was in bad faith. The trial court rendered summary
judgment for State Farm, holding lack of coverage over the injury.4° 1
The court of appeals reversed and remanded. 4° 2 The court found that
391. Id. at 780.
392. Id. at 780-82.
393. Id. at 782.





398. 808 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).
399. Id. at 670.
400. Id. at 669.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 672.
1932 [Vol. 45
INSURANCE LAW
State Farm failed to prove that G.W. intended to cause injury to S.S., differ-
entiating between intentional acts and intentional injury.4° 3 Furthermore,
the record did not show that the conduct in question "was so extreme or
outrageous that intent to harm [could] be inferred as a matter of law." 404
The court rejected State Farm's argument that allowing coverage for
transmission of genital herpes violates public policy by encouraging the
spread of sexual diseases. 4 5 The court's response in analogy was "it cannot
be said that enforcement of the indemnity provisions of an automobile insur-
ance policy encourages collisions." 4°6 The court concluded that S.S. was not
entitled to summary judgment on the contract claim since she did not con-
clusively show G.W. lacked intent to injure her.40 7
C. Premium Rating
The Houston court of appeals recently held, in National Union Fire Insur-
ance Co. of Pittsburgh v. Clemtex, Inc.408 that an insurer could not recover
additional premiums because of an experience rating assigned to the insurer
by the State Board of Insurance. 409 National insured Clemtex under a gen-
eral comprehensive liability policy which provided for premium adjustment
at the end of each policy period based on Clemtex's sales. National sought
an additional $231,146 from Clemtex at the end of a policy period based on
the State Board's experience rating plan.410 Clemtex refused to pay the ad-
ditional amount and instead claimed it was due a refund based on its de-
creased sales over the year. National filed suit, and the trial court granted
summary judgment to Clemtex.4 1'
The court of appeals affirmed.412 First, the court held the policy itself did
not allow for retroactive assessment of additional premiums based on the
State Board's experience rating plan. 41 3 Furthermore, the court found evi-
dence that National neglected to secure an endorsement to the experience
rating plan from Clemtex prior to applying the plan to that specific policy. 41 4
The court then upheld the award for a refund to Clemtex based on its de-
creased sales.415
The legislature has amended article 5.14 of the Texas Insurance Code by
specifically addressing the issue of rates for general liability and commercial
403. 808 S.W.2d at 670.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 671.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 672.
408. 807 S.W.2d. 824 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
409. Id. at 826.
410. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.14 (Vernon Supp. 1992). The experience rating plan
involves a formula used to increase or decrease the annual premium paid by the insured. Id.
411. National Union Fire Ins Co., 807 S.W.2d at 825.
412. Id. at 824.
413. Id. at 825-26. The policy read: "[A]II premiums for this policy shall be computed in
accordance with the company's rules, rates, rating plans, premiums and minimum premiums
applicable to the insurance afforded herein." Id. at 825 (emphasis in original).
414. Id. at 826.
415. Id. at 826-27.
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property insurers in article 5.13-2.416 The new article requires that the in-
surance forms of subject insurers avoid misleading and deceptive lan-
guage.417 It also provides standard forms where necessary. 41 8 The statute
also provides a mechanism by which the aggrieved insured can get a Board
hearing on the rates, supplementary rating information, and any supporting
information filed with the Board by the insurer to establish the appropriate
premiums. 4 19
D. Defenses
In Flowers v. United Insurance C0.420 Mr. and Mrs. Flowers bought a
joint life insurance policy from United. In answering the health questions,
Mr. Flowers denied having had high blood pressure, any disease or disorder
of the heart or circulatory system, or having consulted a physician within
the past five years. Mr. Flowers subsequently died and Mrs. Flowers filed a
claim for life insurance proceeds. United refused to pay, alleging misrepre-
sentation by Flowers. The trial court granted summary judgment 421 for
United based on evidence that showed Mr. Flowers had completed a medical
form three years before, in which he indicated he had high blood pressure.
Furthermore, evidence showed that Mr. Flowers had taken medication for
that condition for two years and had been diagnosed with cardiomegaly (en-
largement of the heart).
The court of appeals listed the five elements an insurer must plead and
prove to establish a misrepresentation defense: "(1) the making of a misrep-
resentation; (2) the falsity of the misrepresentation; (3) reliance on the mis-
representation by the insurer; (4) the intent to deceive on the part of the
insured in making the misrepresentation; and (5) the materiality of the
misrepresentation.9 422
The only issue in dispute was whether United proved Mr. Flowers' intent
to deceive as a matter of law.423 United argued that the fact Mr. Flowers
knew of his health problem showed an intent to deceive. The court of ap-
peals disagreed and found that the evidence raised a fact question as to in-
tent.424 The court reversed and remanded for trial. 425
In Filley v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. 426 the Filleys suffered damages to
their building as a result of Matthews' demolition work on adjacent prop-
erty. They complained to Matthews in 1984, and he informed them of his
insurance with Ohio Casualty. The Filleys sued Matthews but after unsuc-
416. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 5.14(b), 5.13-2 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
417. Id. arts. 5.13-2(1)(a)(5), (8)(a),(e).
418. Id.
419. Id. § 5.13-2(5)(c).
420. 807 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, n. w.h.).
421. Id. at 784.
422. Id. at 785 (citing Mayes v. Massachusetts Mut. Life. Ins. Co., 608 S.W.2d 612, 616
(Tex. 1980)).
423. Id.
424. Id. at 786.
425. Id.
426. 805 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
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cessful efforts to find him, took a default judgment. The Filleys then sued
Ohio Casualty to recover on Matthew's liability policy. The trial court ren-
dered judgment for Ohio Casualty based on Matthews' failure to comply
with policy requirements of giving notice of claims and cooperating with the
insurer.
427
The court of appeals affirmed.428 The court noted that the liability policy
provided that no action would lie against the insurer unless, as a condition
precedent, the insured fully complied with all the terms of the policy.429 The
policy required the insured to give notice regarding any occurrence as soon
as practicable, to immediately forward any suit papers to the insurer, and to
cooperate with the company in making settlements and defending against
the claim.430 Evidence that Ohio Casualty was not informed of the claim
immediately after the Filleys complained to Matthews and that Matthews
could not be found to help in the defense supported the court's conclusion
that Matthews failed to comply with the policy and therefore prejudiced
Ohio Casualty enough to relieve it of any obligation to the Filleys.43 1
The court recognized that "[l]ittle authority exists to explain what consti-
tutes sufficient prejudice to relieve an insurer of liability. '432 Still, the court
concluded that "[tihe failure to notify an insurer of a default judgment until
that judgment has become final results in such prejudice to the insurer that it
is entitled to the benefit of the failure of notice policy defense. '433
The court of appeals then held that the Filleys were not third-party benefi-
ciaries until they obtained a judgment against the insured.434 Reasoning
that the Filleys obtained the rights and obligations of the insured only at the
time of judgment, the court held that since Matthews did not comply with
the policy requirements "Ohio Casualty had no contractual obligations to
the Filleys. ' '4 35
In Members Insurance Co. v. Branscum 436 Members hired an independent
adjuster to investigate an accident claim involving Branscum and Members'
insured. Settlement negotiations failed, and Branscum's attorney told the
adjuster of intent to file suit. Branscum served the insured and Branscum's
attorney advised the adjuster that suit had been filed. The insured did not
inform Members of the suit or forward the suit papers as requested by the
adjuster and required by the policy. Branscum received a default judgment
427. Id. at 845.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 846. The no action clause provided:
No action shall lie against the company unless, as a condition precedent thereto,
there shall have been full compliance with all of the terms of this policy, nor
until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally deter-
mined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial ....
Id.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 847.
432. 805 S.W.2d at 847.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 848.
436. 803 S.W.2d 462 (rex. App.-Dallas 1991, n.w.h.).
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and thereafter demanded payment of the policy limits from Members.
Members refused.
In the suit between Branscum and Members, Members argued that the
insured's failure to cooperate by transmitting the suit papers, resulting in
default judgment, prejudiced Members in the defense of the claim since it
was not informed of the judgment until after the appropriate time period to
have the judgment set aside. The trial court held that Members did not
prove substantial prejudice by the insured's failure to notify of the suit since
Members had actual notice of the suit in time to protect its interest. 437 The
court awarded Branscum the policy limits. 4 38
On appeal, Members argued that the insured's failure to comply with the
policy requirements prejudiced it as a matter of law and no coverage should
be available to Branscum. Members contended it was prejudiced because the
breach of policy provisions denied Members the opportunity to defend the
claim as well as the suit. The court held that prejudice was determined by
whether Members received notice or not.439 Branscum argued that Mem-
bers had actual notice of the suit in proper time to defend since his attorney
informed the adjuster of the intent to sue. The court differentiated between
notice of suit and notice of claim, holding that actual knowledge of a claim
does not equate to knowledge of a suit.440 Branscum's assertion of intent to
file suit was not appropriate notice to Members to impose a duty to take
action on the claim. 441
The court also addressed the level of prejudice necessary to succeed in a
lack of notice defense, although this question was not at issue. 442 The court
rejected the general rule that an insurer shows prejudice only when the in-
sured fails to cooperate or forward papers and the insurer can show that it
was substantially prejudiced by the breach.443 Instead, the court relied on
the Texas State Board of Insurance Order No. 22582 in holding that no
element of substantiality is required in showing prejudice to the insurer by
the insured's failure to forward suit papers." 4 The court of appeals reversed
the trial court judgment and ordered that Branscum take nothing." 5
Hirsch v. Texas Lawyers' Insurance Exchange446 involved issues of notice
to the insurer with respect to claims-made policies. Hirsch and his corpora-
tion were insured by two TLIE malpractice policies, one in effect from April
3, 1986, to April 3, 1987, and the other from June 5, 1987, to June 5, 1988.
Hirsch, individually, and the corporation were sued for malpractice on April
21, 1986. Hirsch notified TLIE of the suit on December 14, 1987. TLIE
denied coverage, asserting that the late notice precluded coverage since this
437. Id. at 463.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 466.
440. Id. at 466-67.
441. 803 S.W.2d at 466-67.
442. Id. at 467.
443. Id. (citing J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICES § 4771 (1962)).
444. Id.; see Tex. State Bd. of Ins. Order No. 22582 (Jan. 1973).
445. Members Ins. Co., 803 S.W.2d at 467.
446. 808 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
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was a claims-made policy" 7 in which coverage depended on the claim being
made and reported during the policy period. In a declaratory judgment, the
trial court agreed with TLIE.448
The court of appeals rejected the argument that Hirsch and the corpora-
tion were separate entities and that the corporation gave timely notice.44 9
The court held that while the corporation was a separate entity, it could only
act through its officers and agents.450 When Hirsch, as president of the cor-
poration, learned of the claim, notice was also given to the corporation. 4 1
Furthermore, Hirsch's letter to TLIE referenced both the action against
himself individually and that against the corporation. 452
Hirsch argued that TLIE denied coverage based on the gap in coverage
but later inappropriately claimed denial based on the late notice defense.
The court held that TLIE's letter of denial must be read in its entirety and,
in so doing, the letter specified details of effective notice.4 5 3 Therefore, TLIE
did not waive its late notice defense.454
Next, Hirsch argued that strict compliance with the claims-made notice
provisions violated Texas law and public policy because they failed to in-
clude extended reporting provisions. The court rebutted this argument by
finding the policy unambiguous in stating that coverage extends only to
claims made and reported within the policy period.455 The court also found
that policy was not unjust and that there was ample freedom of contract
since the policy was unambiguous. 45 6
Finally, Hirsch argued that TLIE should have been required to show prej-
udice from his failure to give timely notice. The court of appeals held that
"[t]o require a showing of prejudice for late notice would defeat the purpose
of "claims-made" policies, and in effect, change such a policy into an "oc-
currence" policy."'457
The court of appeals dealt with another notice issue involving a claims-
made policy in Komatsu v. United States Fire Insurance Co.458 Komatsu
and his attorney, Murad, were sued as guarantors on various loans. Ko-
matsu filed a cross-claim against Murad, alleging fraudulent inducement.
The cross-claim was filed on the last effective day of Murad's claims-made
447. Id. at 563 (occurrence policy differs in that coverage attaches once the occurrence
takes place even though the claim may not be made until much later); see also Edinburgh
Consol. I.S.D. v. INA, 806 S.W.2d 910, 913, 914 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, n.w.h.)
(claim in claims-made policy included actions taken by terminated teacher such as termination
hearings before the school district Board of Trustees and the Texas Education Agency, as well
as instigation of actual suit against the school district).
448. Hirsch, 808 S.W.2d at 562.




453. 808 S.W.2d at 564.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 565.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. 806 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
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malpractice insurance policy with USFIC. Murad notified USFIC of the
cross-claim five days after the policy expired.
Murad settled Komatsu's cross-claim by agreed judgment and assigned
his rights under the USFIC policy to Komatsu. When Komatsu sued US-
FIC to collect on the agreed judgment, the insurer asserted the suit was
barred under the claims-made language in the policy. 45 9 Komatsu admitted
that notice was given beyond the policy period, but argued that the require-
ment was unenforceable under Texas law, which finds void any contract
stipulation requiring less than ninety days notice of claim of damages as a
condition precedent to right to sue.460 The trial court and court of appeals
granted summary judgment for USFIC.46 1
The court of appeals found that the history of section 16.071 of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code and prior cases construing the statute had
limited its application to claims that were causes of action between the con-
tracting parties.462 The court reasoned that Komatsu's claim against Murad
did not give rise to a claim for damages in Murad's behalf against USFIC.4 63
Furthermore, the claims-made notice period makes policies more affordable
to the public.464 Judicial expansion of that period would be unbargained
for.465
E. Apportionment of Excess Carriers' Liability
In Utica National Insurance Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.4 66 George
Pocock recovered $2.2 million for injuries sustained in an automobile acci-
dent in which he was a passenger in a car driven by Landfair. Both persons
carried primary and excess insurance. Primary insurance coverage
amounted to $1,350,000, resulting in a balance of $850,000 which was paid
by Utica, Pocock's insurer. Utica sought contribution from Fidelity. Both
companies conceded to liability under the excess coverage policies but Fidel-
ity argued that Landfair's remaining excess carriers were responsible, and
the court should apportion the amount of contribution to reflect their per-
centages of coverage. 467 The trial court held that the other excess policies
should not be considered when determining the pro rata share between Fi-
delity and Utica. 468 The trial court apportioned liability in a ratio of Utica's
$10 million collectible excess to Fidelity's $5 million collectible excess (2:1
459. See supra note 446 and accompanying text for the difference between claims-made and
occurrence policies.
460. Komatsu, 806 S.W.2d at 605 (construing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 16.071 (Vernon 1986)).
461. Id. at 604.
462. Id. at 605-07.
463. Id. at 607.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. 812 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
467. In addition to an initial $5,000,000 excess policy carried by Fidelity, another $45,000
in excess coverage was carried by Fidelity and three other insurers.
468. Id. at 658.
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ratio) resulting in indemnification of $283,333.33 by Fidelity to Utica.469
The court of appeals affirmed.470 Fidelity contended that the pro rata
apportionment was incorrect because it did not include all of the excess poli-
cies. The court of appeals rejected this argument, finding the policy lan-
guage unambiguous with regard to the third level excess carriers
obligations. 471 To hold otherwise "would render meaningless the conditions
precedent that the underlying insurance must be exhausted. '472
V. CONTRIBUTION
A. Multiple Carriers
In M.J.R. Corp. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co. 47 3 M.J.R. Corp. operated sev-
eral night clubs and had liability coverage through Western Lloyds and
Scottsdale. Jacobs was injured in a fight that occurred at M.J.R.'s Fare
Club. M.J.R. demanded defense and coverage from both insurers. Western
Lloyd's agreed, but Scottsdale declined, arguing that the policy excluded oc-
currences at Fare Club. Jacob received judgment for $12,000. Western
Lloyds paid the judgment and then sued Scottsdale for contribution.
Both insurers issued multi peril policies that contained first-party property
coverage and third-party liability coverage. Each policy contained two in-
suring endorsements. The first, TXCMP-200, provided coverage for liability
for bodily injury or property damage, but excluded coverage for claims aris-
ing out of operations of premises other than insured premises. The second
endorsement, TXCMP-202, also provided coverage for bodily injury and
property damage but did not contain the exclusion for uninsured premises.
Scottsdale argued that TXCMP-202 was premises-restricted since it desig-
nated Geno's Lounge and other premises but did not specifically designate
Fare Club. The court held that although TXCMP-200 specifically limited
coverage to designated premises, the TXCMP-202 endorsement had to be
read separately.474 Because TXCMP-202 did not limit coverage to desig-
nated premises, M.J.R. was entitled to coverage and defense. 475 The court
held that Scottsdale was liable as co-insurer for half the amount of the un-
derlying judgment and half the defense CoStS. 4 7 6
469. Id.
470. Id. at 663.
471. Id. at 661-62. The Beasley policy read:
2. LIMIT OF LIABILITY - UNDERLYING LIMITS
It is expressly agreed that liability shall attach to the Company only after the
Underlying Umbrella Insurers [Fidelity and Utica] have paid or have been held
liable to pay the full amount of their respective ultimate net loss liability ....
Id. at 662.
472. Id. at 662-63.
473. 803 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, n.w.h.).
474. Id. at 430.





In Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. v. Walker County Agency 477 Hartford
denied Jackson's workers' compensation claim. Jackson received a favorable
judgment from the IAB and Hartford appealed to the district court. Jack-
son then raised bad faith claims against Hartford. The parties settled before
trial but Hartford continued the suit by filing a cross-action against agent
Walker County for contribution, indemnity, fraud, and breach of fiduciary
duty. Walker County argued that although Hartford was a joint tortfeasor,
it was not entitled to contribution or indemnity because it had settled. Hart-
ford argued that the causes of action against Hartford were the result of
Walker's actions as insurance agent. Hartford also argued statutory indem-
nification rights since Jackson's original claims were based on the DTPA.
The trial court granted Walker's motion for summary judgment. 478
The court of appeals held that Hartford and Walker were not joint
tortfeasors. 479 The court reasoned that Hartford, as insurer, owed the
worker contractual and statutory duties to provide coverage and the com-
mon law duty of good faith and fair dealing.480 Although the insurer in-
curred these duties, the agent did not and therefore was not a co-
tortfeasor.4 1a
The court recognized that common law indemnity between joint
tortfeasors does not exist in Texas.482 The court held, however, that Hart-
ford could be indemnified for the amount paid to settle the claim based on
the principal-agent relationship.4 83 Furthermore, Hartford could also re-
cover exemplary damages in the form of attorney's fees incurred in defend-
ing the suit that Hartford would not have been required to participate in but
for Walker's actions.4 84
Finally, the court rejected Hartford's assertion that it was entitled to stat-
utory indemnification under the DTPA.485 The DTPA allows contribution
from one who may have liability for the action of which the consumer com-
plains.4 86 The court held that Jackson's workers' compensation claim was
not brought under the DTPA and therefore Hartford had no statutory right
of indemnification. 487 Although Jackson's breach of good faith and fair
dealing claim was brought in part under the DTPA, the court held that
because there was no finding of liability for breach of this duty against
Walker, and Hartford had voluntarily settled that claim, Hartford had no
477. 808 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. App--Corpus Christi 1991, no writ).
478. Id. at 683-84.
479. Id. at 686-87.
480. Id. at 686.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 689 (relying on Aviation Office, Inc. v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 751




486. Id.; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.555 (Vernon 1987).
487. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 808 S.W.2d at 689.
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right to indemnification under the DTPA.488
VI. JURISDICTION
A. Choice of Forum
In City of Rose City v. Nutmeg Insurance Co. 48 9 the Fifth Circuit held that
a service of suit endorsement gave the insured or its assignee the right to
select a forum.490 After Smith secured a judgment against Rose City in the
amount of $3,500,000, Rose City assigned its rights in a general liability
policy issued by Nutmeg to Smith. Smith then brought an action against
Nutmeg in Texas state court seeking to satisfy its judgment. Nutmeg re-
moved the case to federal court. The court denied Smith's motion to remand
and granted Nutmeg's motion for summary judgment.49' The Fifth Circuit
vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded to the state
court.
4 9 2
Smith argued that the insurance policy contained a service of suit endorse-
ment by which Nutmeg waived its right to remove the action from state
court. The endorsement provided:
In the event of our ... failure to pay any amount claimed to be due
under your ... policy, we, at your request agree to submit to the juris-
diction of any Court of Competent jurisdiction within the United States
and will comply with all requirements necessary to give such Court ju-
risdiction and all matters arising hereunder shall be determined in ac-
cordance with the law and practice of such Court.493
The Fifth Circuit held that this language allows the policyholder to choose
the forum in which any dispute will be heard.494
B. Service of Process
A Texas court of appeals held that service of the president of an insurance
company is insufficient to assert jurisdiction over the company in Commo-
dore County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tkacik.495 Tkacik sued Commodore
County Mutual Insurance Co. (CCM) for breach of contract and breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing. After the time period for CCM to
answer and appear expired, Tkacik was awarded a default judgment in the
amount of $107,600 plus ten percent postjudgment interest and costs. The
appellate court found that the trial court had not attained jurisdiction over
CCM due to a lack of effective service.496 Tkacik failed to produce a record,
as required by article 1.36 of the Texas Insurance Code, affirmatively show-
ing that service was had at either CCM's home office or principle place of
488. Id. at 689-90.
489. 931 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 301 (1991).
490. Id. at 15.
491. Id. at 14.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 16.
495. 809 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, writ denied).




The court found that while it may be logical that the office of the president
will be located at the company's home office, because it was not necessarily
so the court could not make that assumption.4 98 The court held that
although the record affirmatively showed that Tkacik attempted service, it
was ineffective under the insurance code.499
C. In Personam Jurisdiction over Foreign Companies
In El Paso Reyco, Inc. v. Malaysia British Assurance500 the El Paso court
of appeals held that in personam jurisdiction over a foreign insurance com-
pany was proper because the company had purposefully established contacts
with the forum state and the exercise of jurisdiction comported with fair play
and substantial justice.50 1 In a prior suit, Nabham had obtained a judgment
against El Paso Reyco for $95,000. These parties joined together in a suit
against Pioneer for failure to defend and indemnify Reyco in the earlier suit.
A jury found for Pioneer, but after a new trial was granted Pioneer became
insolvent, and a default judgment was entered against it for treble damages
and attorney's fees. 502
The suit in the present case sought to recover on that judgment against
Malaysia British, the reinsurer for Pioneer. In response to this suit, Malay-
sia British filed a special appearance to contest the trial court's jurisdiction.
The trial court sustained the special appearance of the foreign reinsurer. 50 3
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for trial on the
merits.504
In deciding whether a Texas court could exercise jurisdiction over a for-
eign insurer that had never done business in this state, but that had entered
into a reinsurance agreement with a primary insurer that insured a Texas
corporation, the court considered the due process requirements that the non-
resident defendant purposefully establish minimum contacts with the forum
state and that the exercise of jurisdiction comport with fair play and substan-
tial justice.50 5 The court determined that Malaysia British had purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas and thereby
invoked the benefits and protections of Texas' laws by agreeing to provide
reinsurance coverage for policies issued by Pioneer to Texas residents. 506 By
doing so, Malaysia British knew that claims under those policies could be
litigated in Texas courts. 50 7
The court also concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction comported with
497. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art 1.36 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
498. Commodore County Mut. Ins Co., 809 S.W.2d at 630.
499. Id. at 631.
500. 808 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ requested).
501. Id. at 530-31.
502. Id. at 530.
503. Id. at 529.
504. Id. at 530.
505. 808 S.W.2d at 530.
506. Id. at 530-31.
507. Id. at 531.
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fair play and substantial justice.508 Texas has a strong interest in maintain-
ing avenues of relief for Texas residents whose insurers fail to pay claims.5°9
Residents of the state would be unfairly burdened if forced to follow an in-
surance company to a foreign state in order to hold it legally accountable. 510
But in Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays,
P.L. C. 51 the Texas supreme court held that exercising in personam jurisdic-
tion over a foreign insurer violates notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.512 Southern Clay, a Texas corporation, was a subsidiary of English
China, an English corporation, that was insured by Guardian, an English
insurer. The Guardian insurance extended to all subsidiaries of English
China, and Southern Clay had a separate liability policy with U.S. Fire In-
surance Co (USFIC). In 1982 a Southern Clay employee was killed on the
job. The employee's family filed wrongful death suits against English China
and Southern Clay. USFIC contributed approximately $600,000 to settle
the claims and then brought a subrogation suit against Guardian seeking
reimbursement based on the theory that Guardian was the primary insurer.
Guardian filed a special appearance arguing that it did not have sufficient
minimum contacts with Texas to allow the court to exercise personal juris-
diction without offending traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case. 51 3 The court of appeals
reversed.514 The supreme court reversed and upheld the decision of the trial
court.
515
The supreme court held that the first element of the jurisdictional formula
is whether the defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts
with Texas.516 This requires "a 'substantial connection' " between the non-
resident defendant and Texas arising from the action or conduct of the non-
resident defendant purposefully directed towards Texas. 517 The second
requirement is that the assertion of personal jurisdiction comport with fair
play and substantial justice. 518 Once minimum contacts are shown, the de-
fendant must "present 'a compelling case that the presence of some consider-
ation would render jurisdiction unreasonable.' "519
In this case, the court found that Guardian established minimum contacts
by insuring all subsidiaries of English China, including those in the United
States.5 20 Guardian could reasonably foresee that a subsidiary would be-




511. 815 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1991).
512. Id. at 232.
513. Id. at 225.
514. Id.
515. Id. at 233.
516. 815 S.W.2d at 230.
517. Id. (footnote omitted).
518. Id. at 231.
519. Id.
520. Id. at 231-32.
521. 815 S.W.2d at 230.
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court found that in this particular case, however, exercise of personal juris-
diction would violate the second factor.522 To require an English insurer
unaffiliated with American companies to litigate a dispute with its English
insured in the judicial system of another nation would be burdensome since
all acts relating to the creation and performance of the policy had occurred
in England. 523
The court was careful to point out that the regulatory interest of the fo-
rum state is significant. Texas has an interest in maintaining an effective
means of redress when insurers fail to pay claims.524 The state's residents
"would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the insur-
ance company to a distant state to hold it legally accountable. '5 25 These
considerations did not tip the balance in this case because this was a suit for
reimbursement by USFIC rather than a suit by the family of the deceased
employee of Southern Clay.526 Because neither Guardian nor USFIC were
Texas consumers or insureds, the interest of Texas in adjudicating the dis-
pute was considerably diminished. 527 The court concluded that Texas did
not have a compelling interest in providing a forum for the resolution of
disputes between foreign insurers.5 28
Justice Mauzy dissented. He viewed the pertinent inquiry as being
whether Guardian should have reasonably foreseen that it would be "'haled
into court' in Texas."'529 He argued that Guardian should have foreseen this
possibility when it agreed to insure an entity with substantial contacts with
Texas.530 He also argued that USFIC stood in the shoes of the insureds and
should have the benefit of the substantial interest Texas has in providing a
forum for its residents.531 In his view, the result should not vary depending
on whether the suit was brought by the insured or by the insurer seeking
subrogation. 532 Texas has an interest in subrogation claims since the claims
facilitate plaintiff's recoveries and allow the allocation of loss according to
responsibility. 533 Based on these considerations, Justice Mauzy concluded
that asserting personal jurisdiction would not violate due process. 534
From these two cases it is clear that the test for in personam jurisdiction is
whether the company has established minimum contacts with the forum
state and whether exercising personal jurisdiction would violate notions of
fair play and substantial justice. Meeting the first part of the test is relatively
simple. Contacts can be established even though the company has never
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Id. at 229, 233.
525. Id. at 233.
526. 815 S.W.2d at 232-33.
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. Id. at 233 (Mauzy, J., dissenting).
530. Id.






dealt directly with Texas or a Texas company. The supreme court has found
that location of the home states or countries of the parties is relevant to the
second part of the inquiry. The forum state has a diminished interest in
providing a forum if all parties are nonresidents.
VII. ERISA
A. Applicability of ERISA
In MDPhysicians & Associates, Inc. v. Wrotenbery531 the federal district
court for the Northern District of Texas held that state law can require a
self-funded multiple employer welfare plan to obtain a certificate of author-
ity as a Texas insurer. 536 MDPhysicians & Associates was the administrator
of the MDP plan, a self-funded multiple employer welfare arrangement
(MEWA). The State Board of Insurance required the MDP plan to obtain a
certificate of authority to do business as an insurer. The MDP plan sought a
declaratory judgment, asserting it was an ERISA plan and therefore could
not be governed by state law. The district court held to the contrary. 537
The issue turned on whether the MDP plan as a MEWA was also a valid
ERISA employee benefit plan. The court held that not all MEWA's are also
protected under ERISA. 538 An ERISA welfare plan is defined as a:
1) . . .plan, fund or program 2) established or maintained 3) by an
employer or by an employee organization, or by both, 4) for the purpose
of providing medical, surgical, hospital care, sickness, accident, disabil-
ity, death, unemployment or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other
training programs, day care centers, scholarship funds, prepaid legal
services or severance benefits 5) to the participants or their
beneficiaries. 539
The MDP plan was established by a group of physicians. The plan was not
fully insured and participants had an option of seeking treatment from a
planned provider at ninety percent (90%) coverage or from a non-network
medical service provider at eighty percent (80%) coverage. The plan was
not limited to employees of the physicians but instead was offered to various
employers.
The court found the MDP plan was not an employee welfare benefit plan
under ERISA and, as a result, the court dismissed the suit for want of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.540 The court reasoned that the employees of sub-
scribing employers were not employees as related to the plan since the plan
did not employ the participants and there was no economic relationship be-
tween the two.54 I The court held that "[t]he relationship between employees
and the Plan is like the relationship between a private insurance company
535. 762 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
536. Id. at 699.
537. Id.
538. Id. at 696.
539. Id. at 697 (citing Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir.
1988) (quoting Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1371 (11th Cir. 1982) (enbanc))).




and the beneficiaries of a group insurance program. ' '542
The court found it insignificant that the plan was well-organized and com-
plied with ERISA by filing the necessary documents, including a written
summary plan description. 543 The court also rejected the argument that
each individual employer participant could qualify as an ERISA plan.544
MDPhysicians did not plead suit as a fiduciary for participants nor did it
prove that each plan was "'established' and 'maintained' as an employee
welfare benefit plan" by the individual employers. 545
Finally, the court held that regardless of whether the plan was determined
to be an employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA, because the plan was
not fully insured it would still be subject to state law.54 6 Underinsured
MEWA's are subject to state laws to the extent that state laws are not incon-
sistent with ERISA. 547 The court held that the state requirement of a certifi-
cate of authority to conduct business in Texas is not inconsistent with
ERISA's requirement of a filed plan description, modifications, annual re-
ports, and supplemental reports with the Secretary of Labor.548
In Burghart v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. 549 the court of ap-
peals discussed how to determine whether an insurance plan constitutes an
ERISA plan.5 50 Edna Burghart purchased disability insurance from her em-
ployer. After becoming disabled, Burghart was denied payment and sued
Connecticut General under DTPA and article 21.21. The trial court granted
summary judgment for Connecticut General, holding that Burghart's claims
were preempted by ERISA.551 The court of appeals reversed. 552
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to raise an issue of mate-
rial fact as to whether the insurance plan was an ERISA plan. 553 Burghart
presented evidence that the plan fit within an exception to ERISA's defini-
tion of employee benefits. She established that no contributions were made
by her employer, participation in the program was voluntary, her employer's
only function was to collect premiums through payroll deductions, and that
the employer received no consideration for its action with regards to the
plan. The court held that although this evidence could establish an excep-
tion to ERISA, whether a plan is in fact an ERISA plan must be determined
in light of all the circumstances. 554 The court recognized that the purchase
of insurance absent ERISA's required elements, does not in itself establish
an ERISA plan. 555
542. Id.
543. Id. at 698.
544. Id.
545. MDPhysicians, 762 F. Supp. at 698.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 698-99 (citing 29 U.S.C. 1144(b)(6)(A)(ii) (1988)).
548. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. 1021(b) (1988)).
549. 806 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, n.w.h.)'
550. Id. at 327.
551. Id. at 325-26.
552. Id. at 325.
553. Id. at 327.
554. Id. (citing Employee Benefit Welfare Plan, 29 C.F.R. 2510.3-1(j) (1988)).
555. Id. (citing Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1375 (11 th Cir. 1982) (en banc)).
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Alternatively, the court held that even if there was an ERISA plan,
Burghart's pleadings would be liberally construed to state a claim for bene-
fits under ERISA. 556 Burghart alleged the existence of the disability policy
and claimed she was entitled to benefits. The court held that the evidence
presented entitled her to present her case to a jury whether it be under ER-
ISA or state law.557
In Hansen v. Continental Insurance Co. 558 Martin Hansen's wife died in
an automobile accident. Hansen filed a claim with his employer (Fairfield),
who served as benefits administrator for the group accidental death and dis-
memberment insurance policy issued by Continental. Continental tendered
Hansen a check for $80,000 but Hansen refused the check and demanded
payment of $120,000 as dictated by the policy. Continental denied the pay-
ment and Hansen sued in state court, alleging violations of article 21.21 and
the DTPA, breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing,
and breach of contract. Continental contended that the plan was covered
under ERISA and removed the case to federal district court. The district
court held that the Fairfield plan was covered by ERISA but that Continen-
tal had violated ERISA so that Hansen was entitled to the $120,000 plus
interest and attorney's fees.5 59
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment in all respects. 560 The court be-
gan by discussing whether the Fairfield plan was an ERISA employee wel-
fare plan. 561 The Department of Labor developed criteria that excludes
benefits plans from ERISA coverage. 562 The regulations specify that ERISA
does not include group insurance programs offered to employees in which
(1) No contributions are made by an employer or employee
organization;
(2) Participation [in] the program is completely voluntary for employ-
ees or members;
(3) The sole functions of the employer or employee organization with
respect to the program are, without endorsing the program, to per-
mit the insurer to publicize the program to employees or members,
to collect premiums through payroll deductions or dues checkoffs
and to remit them to the insurer; and
(4) The employer or employee organization receives no consideration
in the form of cash or otherwise in connection with the program,
other than reasonable compensation, excluding any profit, for ad-
ministrative services actually rendered in connection with payroll
deductions or due checkoffs. 563
The court found that Fairfield had made no contributions to the plan, that
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. 940 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1991).
559. Id. at 975.
560. Id. at 973.
561. Id. at 975-78.
562. Id. at 976.




participation was completely voluntary, and that Fairfield had received no
compensation from the program.5 64 Still, evidence of Fairfield's involve-
ment showed that Fairfield endorsed the plan and distributed a booklet in its
own name encouraging employees to participate in the plan.565 Therefore,
the plan was not excluded from ERISA by the Department of Labor
regulations. 566
The court investigated further to establish whether the Fairfield program
qualified as a plan under the ERISA definition. 567 The court concluded that
a plan did exist and was an ERISA plan because Fairfield established and
maintained the plan by administration and payment of benefits and
premiums. 568
With the conclusion that the plan is an ERISA plan, preemption is appli-
cable.569 The court rejected the savings clause argument since the claims
were for remedies not offered under ERISA. 570 The savings clause provides
that "nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any
person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities. '571 Recognizing exclusive jurisdiction over ERISA claims, the
court held that "[elven if Hansen is correct that ERISA provides no ade-
quate remedy, . . . his state law claims would still be preempted. '572
The court agreed that Hansen should receive the $120,000 as designated
on the summary plan description. 5 "a The court held that ambiguities in the
policy should be resolved against the insurer and that the summary plan
description controlled over the master plan since there was an ambiguity
between them and the summary plan description favored the insured.574
The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plan in
question did not affect commerce in Sheffield v. Allstate Life Insurance
Co. 575 Sheffield sued Allstate in state court for costs of medical treatment,
asserting breach of contract and misrepresentation. Allstate removed the
case to federal court contending that ERISA governed. The federal court
ordered the case remanded because ERISA coverage did not extend to Shef-
field's employer since interstate commerce was not affected to the degree
required by ERISA's jurisdictional limit.5 76
There was no dispute that the medical plan at issue was an employee wel-




568. 940 F.2d at 978.
569. Id. at 979.
570. Id.
571. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988).
572. Hansen, 940 F.2d at 979.
573. Id. at 981-83.
574. Id. at 981-82; see also Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 134, 136
(6th Cir. 1988) ("statements in a summary plan are binding and if such statements conflict
with those in the plan itself, the summary shall govern").




fare benefit plan as defined in ERISA.577 ERISA coverage extends, how-
ever, "only to plans established by employers engaged in an industry or
activity affecting commerce. ' 578 The court held that in order to affect com-
merce, the labor relations of the business had to affect interstate com-
merce. 579 Sheffield's employer's business had only two employees and
involved activities mainly within Texas. The court concluded that it did not
have subject matter jurisdiction over the case and remanded it to state
court.
5 80
In Shirley v. Maxicare Texas, Inc. 581 Shirley was covered by health insur-
ance through her employer, the Aldine Independent School District. After
Shirley was diagnosed as needing a liver transplant, Maxicare changed the
policy to cease coverage over transplants. Shirley sued in state court seeking
a declaration that Maxicare could not apply this change retroactively. Max-
icare claimed ERISA preemption and removed the case to federal court.
The court ordered arbitration.58 2 The arbitrator ruled that coverage existed
for a reasonable time after the change and that the transplant would be cov-
ered if it took place within three years. The arbitrator also awarded Shirley
$25,000 in attorney's fees for the arbitration. Maxicare sought district court
approval of the arbitration award and Shirley appealed.
The court of appeals held that the federal district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction since ERISA does not apply to governmental plans. 583
The court also held void the district court's arbitration order since it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to begin with. 584 Maxicare argued that accept-
ance of the arbitration award of attorney's fees estopped Shirley from chal-
lenging the validity of arbitration. The court of appeals held that when
subject matter jurisdiction is at issue "the consent of the parties is irrelevant
and principles of estoppel do not apply. ' 585 The court concluded that Shir-
ley could challenge the court's subject matter jurisdiction despite the
award. 58 6
B. ERISA Preemption
In Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 58 7 the Supreme Court of
Texas held that ERISA preempts suits brought under the DTPA and arti-
577. Id. at 309.
578. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. 1003(a) (1988)).
579. Id. at 309, 310.
580. Id. at 310.
581. 921 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1991).
582. Id. at 566.
583. Id. at 567 (citing 29 U.S.C. 1003(b) (excludes governmental plans); 1002(32) (defines
governmental plan as a plan established and maintained for it employees by the United States
government or any state government or any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of
a government) (1988)).
584. Id. at 568.
585. Id. (quoting Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)
(principles of estoppel do not apply to issues of subject matter jurisdiction)).
586. Id. at 569.
587. 805 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2855 (1991).
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cles 21.21 and 3.62 of the Texas Insurance Code.588 James Cathey was em-
ployed by Dow Chemical. He and his wife were insured by the Dow
Medical Care Program. Mrs. Cathey was diagnosed as having severe multi-
ple sclerosis, and her doctor ordered twenty-four-hour nursing care. The
expenses were paid under the Dow Medical Care Program until 1985, when
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MET) refused to continue payment.
Michael Maddolin, group claim consultant for MET, told Cathey the claims
were discontinued because there was no medical necessity for the constant
nursing care.
The Catheys filed suit in state court against Dow, MET, and Maddolin,
alleging violations of the DTPA and articles 3.62 and 21.21 of the Texas
Insurance Code. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of all
three defendants on the basis that the claims were preempted by ERISA.589
The court of appeals affirmed. 59°
The supreme court recognized that ERISA preempts all state laws to the
extent that they relate to employee pension and welfare benefit plans.591 The
preemption clause is limited by ERISA's savings clause, which provides that
ERISA shall not "be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any
state law that regulates insurance, banking, or securities. '5 92 The savings
clause is, in turn, limited by the deemer clause, which provides that no em-
ployee benefit plan "shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other
insurer.., for purposes of any law of any state purporting to regulate insur-
ance companies. '5 93
The court relied on Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., in which the United States
Supreme Court held that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan ... if
it has a connection or reference to such a plan."'5 94 Given this expansive
definition595 and citing multiple cases in which the United States Supreme
Court found tort claims have an effect on employee benefit plans that call for
ERISA preemption,59 6 the court held that the Catheys' claims were also
preempted. 597
Next, the court addressed the savings clause whereby state laws are not
preempted if they regulate insurance.598 The court followed the United
States Supreme Court in holding that ERISA's remedies are exclusive. "The
Court has decided that ERISA's civil enforcement scheme could not be sup-
plemented by state law remedies. 599
588. Id. at 388.
589. Id.
590. Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 764 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist
Dist.] 1988), aff'd, 805 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1991).
591. Cathey, 805 S.W.2d at 389 (citing 29 U.S.C. 1144(a) (1988)).
592. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988)).
593. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988)).
594. Id. (citing Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983)).
595. Id. at 390.
596. 805 S.W.2d at 390.
597. Id.
598. Id. at 391 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)).
599. Id. (relying on Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54).
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Moreover, the court announced that even if the remedies the Catheys
claimed could regulate the insurance industry for exclusion from the ERISA
preemption, the claims were still preempted because they were inconsistent
with the remedies offered through ERISA.6° ° Though Maddolin did not
plead the ERISA preemption, the court held that, because he acted as em-
ployee of MET, the preemption of the Catheys' claims against Dow and
MET would extend to Maddolin. 601
Another case addressing the definition of relate to as applied to ERISA
preemption is Hermann Hospital v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.6 02 Hermann
Hospital admitted and treated Prochnow, an employee of Sam White Olds-
mobile Company, based on Aetna's representation that coverage was effec-
tive under a group plan, despite the fact that Prochnow's employment had
terminated one month prior to hospitalization. Prochnow executed an as-
signment of benefits to Hermann. Aetna denied payment on grounds of lack
of coverage. Hermann filed suit, alleging negligent misrepresentation, equi-
table estoppel, and deceptive and unfair trade practices. The trial court
granted Aetna's motion for summary judgment on ERISA preemption
grounds.6 o3
The court of appeals drew a distinction between derivative claims as as-
signee of benefits and independent claims as third party.6° 4 The court relied
on the Fifth Circuit opinion of Memorial Hospital System v. Northbrook Life
Insurance Co. 605 In Memorial, the Fifth Circuit held that breach of contract
was derivative from the employee's rights under the insurance plan, related
to the employee benefit plan, and was preempted. 6° 6 The Memorial court
found that claims under article 21.21 were unrelated and not preempted
since they were not benefits sought under the policy. 6° 7 The court of appeals
held that Hermann's causes of action for negligent misrepresentation and
article 21.21 violations were not derivative of the policy as Prochnow's as-
signee.6° 8 Instead, Hermann sought damages independently as a hospital
that relied upon the insurer's misrepresentations. The court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court's judgment as to the claim of equitable estoppel in
holding preemption but reversed and remanded the claims of negligent mis-
representation and deceptive trade practices under article 21.21. 609
In Gorman v. Life Insurance Co.6 10 the Texas supreme court held that the
ERISA preemption defense can be raised for the first time on appeal only
600. Id.
601. Id.
602. 803 S.W.2d 351, 352-54 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
603. Id. at 351.
604. Id. at 353 (citing Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236 (5th
Cir. 1990)).
605. Memorial Hosp. Sy&, 904 F.2d at 250.
606. Id.
607. Hermann Hosp. Sys., 803 S.W.2d at 354.
608. Id.
609. Id. at 355.
610. 811 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 88 (1991).
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when it affects choice of forum and not choice of law.6 1' Dale Gorman died
in an automobile accident during the course of employment. Gorman was
insured through an employee benefit plan of which policies were issued by
Life Insurance Company of North America (LINA). LINA denied cover-
age upon the recommendation of Gorman's Employer, Tenneco. Gorman's
beneficiaries sued Tenneco and LINA for breach of contract, fraud, breach
of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, negli-
gence, violations of article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code, violations of
rules and regulations of the State Board of Insurance, and DTPA violations.
The jury rendered a verdict for Gorman but the trial court granted defend-
ants' motion for judgment n.o.v. 6 1 2
The court of appeals reversed the judgment based on ERISA preemp-
tion.613 The court found that the pleadings were broad enough to include
claims under ERISA but that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover since
they did not prove arbitrary and capricious conduct. 614
The supreme court began by addressing the issue of ERISA preemption as
elaborated in Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.61 5 The court held
that when ERISA preemption is asserted as a defense to claims within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts, preemption is an affirmative de-
fense that must be timely pled and proved or is otherwise waived. 616 This
category of concurrent jurisdiction includes claims to recover benefits due
under a plan, actions to enforce rights under a plan, and actions to clarify
rights to future benefits. 617 Based on this reasoning, the court concluded
that the ERISA preemption defense involved the state court's subject matter
jurisdiction.618 As such, the plaintiff's claim against Tenneco for breach of
fiduciary duty was preempted by ERISA.619
The court next considered the plaintiff's claims against LINA. The court
found that the evidence supported the jury finding that Gorman died in the
course of employment, giving rise to the contract claim against LINA.620
Since this claim was for relief also available under ERISA (recovery of bene-
fits due) the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction. 621 Concur-
rent jurisdiction raises a question of choice of law.622 The court held that a
de novo review of ERISA claims is applicable (versus an arbitrary and capri-
cious standard of review) unless the plan expressly authorizes discretionary
authority to the plan administrator or fiduciary in determining eligibility of
611. Id. at 545.
612. Id. at 544.
613. Gorman, 752 S.W.2d 710, 714 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1991), rev'd, 811
S.W.2d 542 (Tex. 1991).
614. Id. at 714.
615. Gorman, 811 S.W.2d at 544-45; see also Cathey, 805 S.W.2d at 391.
616. Gorman, 811 S.W.2d at 546.
617. Id. at 548-49 (footnote omitted) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B), (e) (1988)).
618. Id. at 549.
619. Id.
620. Id.




benefits or construing the terms of the plan.623 Because LINA did not have
explicit discretionary authority to determine eligibility of benefits, de novo
review was appropriate. 624
The court concluded that attorney's fees may be awarded under ERISA
and therefore the trial court had authority to award them in this case. 625
The trial court could not, however, award delay penalties under article 3.62
of the Texas Insurance Code, mental anguish damages, or exemplary dam-
ages because these are forms of relief preempted by ERISA. 626
Pan American Life Insurance Co. v. Erbauer Construction Co. 627 involved
the application of Gorman. Gill worked for Erbauer, which provided group
health insurance to its employees through Pan American Life Insurance
Company. Gill's two year old daughter suffered severe burn and smoke in-
halation injuries in a fire and was taken to Hermann Hospital. Erbauer and
Pan American both confirmed coverage, but later Pan American denied pay-
ment. Hermann Hospital sued Erbauer and Pan American for payment of
the accrued bills, and Erbauer cross-claimed against Pan American alleging
unfair claims settlement practices and violations of the DTPA and the Texas
Insurance Code. The trial court found Pan American liable for treble dam-
ages and interest totaling $4.7 million.628 The court of appeals originally
held that ERISA did not preempt Erbauer's claims since they were ex-
tracontractual. On rehearing the court held that Pan American waived the
preemption defense by not raising it until appeal. 629
In light of Cathey and Gorman, the supreme court held that Erbauer's
claims were preempted by ERISA.630 Furthermore, since the claims at issue
were not in the category of concurrent jurisdiction with the state court, the
defendants could have raised the defense of ERISA preemption for the first
time on appeal. 63 1 The supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of
appeals and rendered judgment for Pan American. 632
The court of appeals held that ERISA preempted causes of action under
the Texas Insurance Code in Silva v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. 6 33 Silva in-
jured his foot while employed with Baker Marine. Aetna refused to pay the
medical expenses based on a policy exclusion for occupational injuries. Silva
sued Aetna, alleging arbitrary and capricious actions in violation of ERISA
and violations of article 21.21.
The court of appeals held that ERISA preempted Silva's state law
623. Id. at 548 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Burch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989)).
624. Id.
625. Id.
626. Id. at 549.
627. 805 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 86 (1991); see also
Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Small, 806 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. 1991).
628. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 805 S.W.2d at 395.
629. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Erbauer Constr. Co., 791 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. App.-Houston
[lIst Dist.] 1991, writ granted), rev'd, 805 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 86 (1991).
630. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 805 S.W.2d at 395.
631. Id. at 396; see Gorman, 811 S.W.2d at 545.
632. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 805 S.W.2d at 395.
633. 805 S.W.2d 820, 823-24 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, n.w.h.).
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claims. 634 Silva argued that the causes of action were saved from preemp-
tion by virtue of the savings clause of ERISA that exempts from preemption
state laws that regulate insurance. Relying on Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.
Dedeaux, the court held that ERISA is intended to preempt all remedies
except those specifically provided for by ERISA. 635
The court next addressed Silva's ERISA claim for breach of fiduciary
duty. The court held that Silva must establish that Aetna acted arbitrarily
and capriciously to succeed on this claim. 636 The court found that Aetna's
refusal to pay was proper since the injury was incurred during the course of
business and was therefore occupational. 637 The court concluded that this
type of policy exclusion was a "satisfactory explanation" for Aetna's failure
to pay benefits under the policy.638
In Petrolite Corp. v. Barnhouse639 the court of appeals held that ERISA
can preempt claims in which the occurrence giving rise to the claim hap-
pened before the enactment of ERISA.64° Barnhouse worked for Petrolite
Corporation and in 1959 was allegedly promised enhanced retirement bene-
fits in return for his work in Venezuela. Barnhouse relied on this promise
until his employment ended in 1971. In 1984, when he sought the retire-
ment benefits, the company refused on the basis that Barnhouse was not
entitled to those benefits until age 65. Barnhouse sued for fraud, breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and failure to pay benefits in accordance
with the terms of the retirement plan. The jury returned a verdict in his
favor and awarded $80,000 in actual and exemplary damages. The court of
appeals reversed and rendered a take nothing judgment against
Barnhouse.64 1
Barnhouse argued that ERISA preemption was inapplicable based on the
statutory exception to preemption of any claim arising, or any act or omis-
sion occurring, before January 1, 1975.642 The court held that the issue
turned on the proper interpretation of the phrase "acts or omissions. '64 3
The court accepted the majority view in holding that the act or omission in
this case was the denial of the claim that occurred in 1984, after ERISA's
effective date, and that preemption was applicable.6"
The court next considered the effect of preemption in this case. Having
determined that ERISA preemption was applicable, the court relied on
Gorman in holding Barnhouse's claims for breach of contract and for declar-
atory relief were within the state court's concurrent jurisdiction, and that
634. Id. at 824.
635. Id. at 823-24 (relying on Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987)).
636. Id. at 824 (citing Reilly v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 846 F.2d 416, 419 (7th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1989)).
637. Id. at 825.
638. Id.
639. 812 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, n.w.h.).
640. Id. at 345.
641. Id. at 343.
642. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(1) (1988)).
643. Id. at 344.
644. Id. at 345.
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ERISA operated to displace state law in favor of federal law as to those
claims. 645 The remaining claims fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal court because they are not specified in 29 U.S.C. section
1132(a)(1)(B)and(e) as claims of concurrent jurisdiction.6 6
The court then held that Barnhouse could not successfully maintain his
claims for breach of contract and declaratory relief under ERISA. 647 Be-
cause section 1102(a)(1) of ERISA "mandates that all employee benefit
plans must be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument,"
ERISA claims therefore cannot be based on oral representations not also
written within the terms of the plan. 64 After justifying the written require-
ments as a means of ensuring stability and solvency of retirement plans, the
court acknowledged that refusing to enforce oral representations is a "be-
trayal without remedy" when an employee relies on an employer's "empty
oral assurances. '"649 Nevertheless, the court felt constrained to follow ER-
ISA's explicit preference for written agreements. 650
VIII. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A. Wrongful Discharge
In International Union UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.65 1 Sullivent in-
curred an occupational injury. He filed a workers' compensation claim and
requested a leave of absence pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement
between his employer, Johnson, and the Union. Johnson responded to a
subsequent request for leave of absence by advising Sullivent to see the plant
physician for an examination. Johnson informed Sullivent that he would be
discharged if he did not see the plant physician. Sullivent sued Johnson,
Wausau, and American (workers' compensation carriers), alleging that the
practice of requiring physical examinations and the express intent to termi-
nate injured employees for failure to visit the plant physician violated article
8306, section 7 and article 8307, section 4 of the Texas Workers' Compensa-
tion Act and IAB rules. 652 Sullivent further alleged that Johnson tortiously
interfered with his right to contract for legal services by not communicating
directly with Sullivent's attorney concerning the injury and that the insur-
ance carriers violated the DTPA and article 21.21 of the Insurance Code.
The trial court granted summary judgment to Johnson and Wausau. 653 The
645. Id.; see Gorman, 811 S.W.2d at 545; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988).
646. Petrolite Corp., 812 S.W.2d at 345-46.
647. Id. at 346.
648. Id. (citing Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1989)).
649. Id.
650. Id.
651. 813 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
652. See Act of May 18, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S. ch. 483, § 6, 1983, Tex. Gen. Laws 2822,
repealed by Act of Dec. 11, 1989, 71st Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 1, § 16.01(7), 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws
1, 4414 (employee has sole right to select or choose the persons or facilities to furnish medical
aid); art. 8307 § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (authorizes IAB to require claimant to submit to
examination before it or someone acting under its authority and to an examination by a physi-
cian of insurance carrier's choice).
653. International Union UAW, 813 S.W.2d at 562.
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court of appeals dismissed the action with prejudice against American. 654
The supreme court reversed and remanded to the appellate court for
consideration. 655
Preliminarily, the court of appeals held that Sullivent's pleadings were suf-
ficient to allege a cause of action under article 8307c, section 1, for wrongful
discharge, even though the original petition did not specifically address arti-
cle 8307c. 656 Furthermore, the court held that the district court properly
had jurisdiction over the case because it involved statutory interpretation
and there is no legislative authority specifically delegating exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the IAB. 657
The court found that articles 8306, section 7 and 8307, section 4 do not
apply to employers since they are not part of the association to which the
statutes by definition apply. 658 As a result, the court overruled Sullivent's
cause of action against Johnson for violation of these articles.659 The court
of appeals would not uphold the orders of summary judgment, however,
because it concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact to be
addressed. 66° Specifically, those issues included: (1) Johnson's motive in re-
questing a plant physician examination and threats of termination, and (2)
whether Johnson's failure to correspond with Sullivent's attorney was based
on a good faith belief in its right to do so. 66 1
In Stoker v. Furr's, Inc. 662 Stoker was employed by Safeway. Safeway was
purchased by Furr's and Furr's offered Stoker a position with them. After
the interview Stoker informed the interviewer of a workers' compensation
claim she maintained against Safeway. Stoker's employment offer was re-
voked. Stoker sued Furr's, alleging employment discrimination in violation
of article 8307c of the Workmen's Compensation Act.663
The court of appeals discussed two issues on appeal. The first concerns
the existence of an employee/employer relationship.664 The court reviewed
the definition of employee within the Workmen's Compensation Act.665 The
court held there was no such relationship because service of employment
had not physically commenced and Furr's had no right to control Stoker
654. Id. at 563.
655. International Union UAW, 786 S.W.2d 265 (rex. 1991) (per curiam).
656. International Union UAW, 813 S.W.2d at 564.
657. Id. at 566.
658. Id. at 567 n.4, (construing Act of May 18, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 483, 6, 1983 Tex.
Gen. Laws 2815, 2822 (repealed 1989) (association is defined as the Texas Employers' Insur-
ance Association or any other insurance carrier authorized under the Act to insure workers'
compensation payments)).
659. Id.
660. Id. at 568.
661. Id.
662. 813 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ requested).
663. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1991).
664. Stoker, 813 S.W.2d at 721.
665. See of May 12, Act 1959, 56th Leg., R.S., ch. 355, 1, 1959 Tex. Gen. Laws 778,
repealed by Act of Dec. 11, 1989, 71st Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 1, 16.01(15), 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws
1,715 (employee defined to "mean every person in the service of another under any contract of
hire, expressed or implied, oral or written").
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until service had commenced. 666
The second issue was whether section 8307c of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, dealing with employment discrimination 667 contemplated prospec-
tive employers. 668 Stoker argued that person meant any person, including a
prospective employer. The court rejected this argument, discussing the leg-
islative history of the act, which showed that the primary purpose was to
benefit and protect employees who are injured during the course of their
employment.669 The court adhered to the Act's definition of employee,
which includes "every person in the service of another under any contract of
hire, ."...670 and concluded that a person could not discharge another per-
son unless he was that person's employer. 67 1 The court concluded that the
legislature could have specifically created a cause of action against any per-
son for discrimination based on a workers' compensation claim but did
not.6
72
Another case involving employer/employee relations is Crawford & Co. v.
Garcia.673 Garcia was injured on her job with Mountain Pass. After several
episodes of continuing problems, she called her regular physician but he was
out of town. She then contacted her employer, Mountain Pass, which ad-
vised her to visit a physician recommended by Crawford, the workers' com-
pensation carrier. She did so but did not return to work despite his release
to do so. Upon return to work Garcia was informed of her termination
based on a company policy to terminate anyone absent for three consecutive
days without satisfactory excuse. Garcia sued for wrongful discharge
against Mountain Pass and the insurance carriers. Mountain Pass settled
and the jury returned a verdict in Garcia's favor against the remaining
defendants.
On appeal, the court held there was no evidence that any conduct of the
insurance carriers caused Garcia damages.674 The court reasoned that Gar-
cia was fired by Mountain Pass for failure to comply with company policy
and that the defendants played no part in her termination. 67 5 The court also
held that the insurance carriers did not commit deceptive trade practices in
recommending examination by a doctor other than Garcia's choice.676 The
court held that such a referral did not interfere with Garcia's right to be
treated by the doctor of her choice because the purpose of the examination
666. Stoker, 813 S.W.2d at 721-22.
667. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (1) ("[n]o person may discharge or in any
other manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has in good faith filed a
claim, hired a lawyer to represent him in a claim, instituted, or caused to be instituted, in good
faith, any proceeding under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act").
668. Stoker, 813 S.W.2d at 733.
669. Id.




673. 817 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ requested).
674. Id. at 102.
675. Id.
676. Id. at 102-03.
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was to determine her eligibility to return to work. 6 7 7 The court of appeals
reversed and rendered judgment for the insurance carriers.678
B. Subscriber Status and Exclusivity
In Harris v. Varo, Inc. 679 Harris was injured when returning from lunch to
her employment with Varo. The IAB denied her workers' compensation
claim, asserting that the injury was not incurred during employment. Harris
sued Varo under premises liability theory and fraud. The trial court granted
Varo's motion for summary judgment.680 The court of appeals reversed the
trial court's decision regarding Harris' fraud claim. 68 1
The controversy concerned the identity of the workers' compensation car-
rier. Varo changed its carrier before Harris' accident, but did not inform the
IAB. Harris contended this was an intentional deception that had caused or
would cause her damages. Harris also argued that Varo's failure to notify
the IAB of the change in carriers caused Varo to lose its subscriber status
and therefore prevented Varo from asserting exclusion from liability under
the Workers' Compensation Act. The court held that Varo maintained its
subscriber status despite the change in carriers because the statute mandates
that the insurer notify the IAB of cancellation, relieving the employer of that
duty.68 2 The court held further that Harris could not succeed on her argu-
ment that Varo should be equitably estopped from asserting the defense of
exclusion because of alleged misrepresentation of the carrier's identity in or-
der to prevent an increase in premiums. 68 3 The court held that since Harris
action had been filed against the correct carrier she was not harmed by the
misrepresentation. 68 4
Next, the court addressed Harris' cause of action for fraud.685 Varo ar-
gued that in order for an intentional tort to defeat the exclusive remedy pro-
vision of the Workers' Compensation Act, the employer must intend the
injury and the injury must actually occur. The court relied on Aranda in
determining that the exclusivity provision precludes only claims based on
work-related injuries. 68 6 The court reasoned that since an employee is not
barred from bringing a separate claim against the insurer for breach of good
faith and fair dealing, it is logical that an employee should also be able to
bring a separate claim against the employer for fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion.68 7 The court concluded that since Harris' claim for fraud was separate
677. Id. at 103.
678. Id.
679. 814 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, n.w.h.).
680. Id. at 521.
681. Id. at 526.
682. Id. at 524 (quoting Act of May 25, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 829, 1987 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2862, repealed by Act of Dec. 11, 1989, 71st Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 1, 16.01(15), 1989 Tex.
Gen. Laws 114.
683. Id. at 525.
684. 814 S.W.2d at 525.
685. Id. at 525-26.
686. Id. at 526; see Aranda v. Ins. Co., 748 S.W.2d 210, 214-15 (Tex. 1988).
687. Harris, 814 S.W.2d at 526.
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from her claim for recovery for her injuries, the fraud cause of action was
not excluded by the Workers' Compensation Act.6 18
C. Right to Subrogation
In E. V.R. II Associates, Ltd. v. Brundige68 9 Brundige was injured while
serving as security employee for Southern Property Management. Liberty
Mutual (Southern's workers' compensation carrier) paid benefits to Brun-
dige for the injury. Brundige sued Enclave (EVR) for premises liability, and
Liberty intervened for subrogation from Brundige to any recovery from
EVR up to the amount paid as benefits. A jury found in favor of Brundige
and awarded $46,500 to Liberty out of Brundige's award.
On appeal EVR challenged the trial court's rulings that allowed Liberty
Mutual to advise the jury of its right to subrogation. EVR argued that this
information was prejudicial to EVR. EVR further argued that the case
should have been bifurcated, as suggested in EVR's oral motion at trial. The
court of appeals referred to Rule 411 of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence,
which proves that evidence of insurance can be offered if done so for issues
other than liability.690
The court held that although the supreme court has found evidence of
insurance benefits confusing to the jury, the evidence should be allowed in
this case for three reasons. 691 First, the court held that an objection to such
evidence without a motion to sever or at least limit the jury's consideration
of the evidence to Liberty Mutual's cause of action would deprive Liberty
Mutual of the right to recovery. 692 Secondly, limiting evidence with regards
to Liberty Mutual would be contrary to Rule 411.693 Finally, evidence of
paid benefits was necessary for Liberty Mutual to prove the specific amount
it was entitled to recoup.694
IX. LEGISLATION
The 1991 Texas Legislature passed House Bill 2695 and House
Bill 62696 which affected numerous and significant changes in the laws gov-
erning the business of insurance in Texas. These changes affected, among
other areas, rate regulation, reinsurance, capital and surplus requirements,
688. Id.
689. 813 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, n.w.h.).
690. Id. at 554-55.
691. Id. at 554 (citing Myers v. Thomas, 143 Tex. 502, 504-508, 186 S.W.2d 811, 812-13
(1945) (evidence of insurance and compensation benefits prejudicial because of confusion to
the jury)).
692. Id. at 555; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8308-4.05(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991)
(insurance carrier has right to subrogation from employee where person other than worker's
employer held liable for compensable injury).
693. E.V.R. lAssocs., Ltd., 813 S.W.2d at 555.
694. Id.
695. Tex. H.B. 2, 72d Leg. R.S., (1991) (codified in scattered sections of TEX. INS. CODE
ANN.).




cancellation and non-renewal of policies, holding companies, and created an
insurance fraud unit and the office of public insurance counsel to represent
consumers' interests in all lines of insurance. 697 The reform legislation also
697. Because of the extent of reform of the insurance code, we have only touched on areas
concerning the relationship between the insured and the insurer. Below is a summary of the
amendments and additions made to the Insurance Code during 1991:
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. L.OA(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (creates Texas Department of
Insurance (TDI) to regulate the business of insurance); art. 1.02(e) (governor shall attempt to
appoint members of minority groups); art. 1.04(b) (State Board of Insurance (Board) to deter-
mine policy for TDI and develop forms, rules and rates); art. 1.04(0 (judicial review of
Board's rulings subject to substantial evidence rule. Court may vacate decisions of the Board in
the interests of justice); art. 1.04(h) (TDI to establish a program to facilitate resolution of
policy holder complaints); art. 1.06(b) (directors, officers, attorneys, agents, and employees of
insurance companies, insurance agents, insurance brokers, or insurance adjustors are ineligible
to be employed by TDI); art 1.06 (after one ceases to be affiliated with TDI, one may not
represent anyone before the Board for two years); art. 1.06D (persons representing clients
before the board more than twice must register); art. 1.09-5 (conditions under which TDI
employees may appear before the board in a proceeding to set rates); art. 1.10 § 7(a) (each
failure to comply with provisions of code subject to forfeiture not to exceed $25,000); art.
1. 1OC (for good cause, TDI may obtain criminal history information on applicants for authori-
zation to engage in the business of insurance); art. 1.LOD (creation of Insurance Fraud Unit);
art. 1. 14A (TDI may not issue an certificate of authority to, and may revoke the certificate of,
any insurance company whose corporate officer has been convicted of a felony involving moral
turpitude or a breach of fiduciary duty); art. 1. 17A (legislature intends that TDI be sufficiently
funded to obtain highly qualified examiners and actuaries); art. 1.19-1(b) (examination of
materials out of state); art. 1.19-1(b) (information obtained under subpoena is not a public
record for the duration of the investigation); art. 1.35A (Office of Public Insurance Counsel
replaces Division of Consumer Protection); art. 1.35A(h) (public counsel may intervene in
matters involving rates, forms, and various types of insurance and on behalf of consumers and
may recommend legislation); art. 1.35B (insurers to pay assessment to defray the costs of the
office of public counsel); art. 1.35D (TDI to maintain a toll-free information and complaint
number); art. 1.40(b) (a person is immune from liability arising from filing reports or other
information relating to fraudulent insurance acts if the information was received from certain
enumerated persons or agencies); art. 2.02(b) (board may require capital and surplus levels in
excess of statutory levels under certain circumstances); art. 2.20(c) (schedule for existing insur-
ance companies to increase to minimum capital and surplus requirements); art. 3.02 § l(b)
(powers of Commissioner where insurance co. fails to meet minimum capital and surplus re-
quirements); art. 3.02 § 2A (board may require excess capital and surplus levels up to a speci-
fied maximum); art. 3.02 § 3A (fraternal benefit societies are subject to the risk capital rules in
§ 2A); art. 3.10 (changes in reinsurance regulations); art. 3.28 (life insurance companies to
submit an actuary's opinion of reserves to the Board annually); arts. 3.50-2, 3.50-3, 3.51-5A
(serious mental illness is defined. Persons providing health care coverage under these sections
may not contract for coverage that is less extensive for serious mental illness that for physical
illness); art. 5.01-1 (subchapter M applies to motor vehicle insurance); art. 5.03-2 (recognizes
stolen vehicle recovery systems and a discount for motor vehicles so equipped); art. 5.05 (re-
corded loss experience and other data to be available at least annually); art. 5.06 81 (board to
develop or approve policy forms and endorsements for motor vehicle insurance); art. 5.06 § 7
(insurance policy forms and endorsements to be in plain language);
art. 5.07-1 (insurer may not limit coverage by specifying repair parts to be used and may not
limit selection of a shop to repair damage); art. 5.13-2 (regulations for general liability and
commercial property coverage rates); art. 5.21 (offense to knowingly misrepresent the value of
property to achieve a rate advantage); art. 5.22(a) (board may suspend agent's license for fail-
ure to comply with an order); art. 5.25(b) (subchapter M applies only to rates for homeowners
and farm and ranch owners, residential fire and allied lines insurance); art. 5.35 (board to
develop policy forms and endorsements for fire and allied lines insurance regulated under sub-
chapter M); art. 5.43-2 § 9(b) (alarm and monitoring devices sold after April 14, 1989, shall
carry a label of a testing laboratory approved by the Board); art. 5.43-2(b); (alarm devices
originally placed before the approved labelling requirement was adopted need not comply); art.
5.43-2(c) (alarm devices not required by statute are exempt if approved by local authority); art.
5.53(g); (subchapter M does not apply to inland marine insurance, rain insurance, or insurance
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made clear that persons engaged in the business of insurance are subject to
Texas anti-trust laws.698
The major changes that may affect litigation under Article 21.21 and the
DTPA concern the prompt payment of claims,699 the burden of proof on
policy exclusions, 7oo and the creation of a private right of action pursuant to
article 21.21-2 (Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act).70 1
against loss by hail on crops); art. 5.73 § 1 (insurers may not receive final rates or profit or
expense recommendations from advisory organizations); art. 5.73 § 3(2)(6) (insurers and advi-
sory organizations may not attempt to monopolize, boycott, or otherwise unreasonably re-
strain trade in an insurance market); art. 5.73 § 4 (Board to require audit of any advisory
organizations that provide rate information to the Board); art. 5.75-1 (changes in reinsurance
regulations); art. 5.96(c) (30 days notice required before the Board makes changes relating to
motor vehicle, fire and allied, workers' compensation, or multiperil insurance); art. 5.96(a-1)
(art. 5.96(c) does not apply to setting flexibility and benchmark rates under subchapter M); art.
5.97(c) (10 days notice required before the Board makes changes relating to inland marine,
rain, hail, home warranty insurance, or insurance under subchapter B); art. 5.101 (creation of
subchapter M, a pilot program on flexible rating for certain insurance lines); art. 9.07A (Board
to establish policy forms for residential real estate transactions); art. 9.38(c) (required disclo-
sures for title insurance agents); art. 17.22(b) (subchapter M does not apply to county mutual
insurance companies); art. 18.23A (restrictions on assuming risk covered by a policy written
by a Lloyd's); art. 19.12A (restrictions on assuming risk covered by a policy written by a
reciprocal exchange); art. 21.07 § 10A (TDI may not issue an agent's license to, and may
revoke the license of, anyone convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude or a breach of
fiduciary duty); art. 21.07-3 (restrictions on managing general agents); art. 21.07-7 (reinsur-
ance intermediary licensing requirements; regulation of brokers' and managers' transactions
with insurers); art. 21.11-1 (cancellation of agency contracts by fire and casualty companies);
art. 21.2 1(d) (deleted requirement that damages be limited to those incurred prior to two years
before the institution of the action); art. 21.21-5 (TDI to study and adopt rules to end discrimi-
nation in rate setting and policy nonrenewal); art. 21.24-1 § 3 (insurer may not restrict the
right of insured to assign benefits under a health care policy to the furnisher of those benefits);
art. 21.28 § 12(d) (state auditor to conduct an annual audit of the liquidator); art. 21.49
§ 6A(a) (general and structural requirements for insurable properties under the Catastrophe
Property Insurance Pool Act); art. 21.49 § 8A (windstorm and hail insurance replacement
cost coverage); art. 21.49 § 8 (windstorm and hail insurance liability limits); art. 21.49 § 9A(b)
(venue for an action against the Texas Catastrophe Property Insurance Association is in the
county where the covered property is located or in Travis County if the Board is joined); art.
21.49-2B (regulation of cancellation and nonrenewal of certain property and casualty policies);
art. 21.49-2C (insurer must file a plan of orderly withdrawal with the commissioner before
withdrawing from writing a line of insurance); art. 21.49-3b (Joint Underwriting Association
Licensing Act); art. 21.55 § 2 (prompt payment of claims; insurer to notify claimant of accept-
ance or rejection of claim within 15 days of receipt of complete claim); art. 21.56(b) (insurer to
notify insured within 30 days of initial offer to settle claim against insured under a casualty
policy); art. 21.57 (prohibited practices regarding withdrawal of premium payments from a
person's account); art. 21.58(b) (insurer has burden of proof as to any affirmative defense or
avoidance, including any language of exclusion and any exception to coverage); art. 21.58A
§ 3 (standards for utilization review; Utilization review agents must be certified by Commis-
sioner); art. 21.58B (members and employees of the Board of Chiropractic Examiners re-
stricted from some consultant activities); art. 21.69 (Board may contract for premium and loss
data); art. 21.71(c) (insurers to maintain a toll-free information and complaint number); art.
21.79E(b),(c) (insurer to bring action for deductible against third party within six months or
notify insured that it will not do so); art. 21.79E (charging different prices for the same service
is an offense); art. 21.79E(a) (insurers authorized to issue credit involuntary unemployment
insurance); art. 22.13 § 2(d) (minimum issued, outstanding, and stated capital required to as-
sume liability under a health, accident, sickness or hospitalization policy).
698. See TEX. Bus. COM. CODE ANN. § 15.03(5) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
699. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.55 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
700. Id. art. 21.58(b).
701. Id. art. 21.21-2.
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A. Prompt Payment of Claims
The legislation enacted article 21.55 as part of the insurance reform enti-
tled "Prompt Payment of Claims" which applies to all claims filed with an
insurer on or after September 1, 1991. 702 This statute replaces articles 3.62
and 3.62-1 which were repealed as of September 1, 1991.703
Article 21.55 makes an insurer violating its provisions liable to the holder
of the policy or beneficiary making the claim for, "in addition to the amount
of the claim, 18% per annum.of the amount of such claim as damages, to-
gether with reasonable attorney's fees as may be determined by the trier of
fact. ' ' 7° 4 The remedy provided by this statute is not exclusive, but is in addi-
tion to any other remedy or procedure provided by any other law or at com-
mon law.70 5
Article 21.55 imposes a duty upon the insurer within fifteen business days
after receiving written notice of a claim to acknowledge receipt of the claim,
commence investigation, and request from the claimant all items, state-
ments, and forms that the insurer reasonably believes will be required.7°6
Within fifteen business days after receiving all items, statements, and forms
required by the insurer in order to secure final proof of loss, the insurer must
provide written notice to the claimant of acceptance or rejection of the claim
and must state the reasons for the rejection.70 7 If the insurer is unable to
accept or reject within the fifteen-business-day period, it must notify the
claimant of the reasons why additional time is needed and within forty-five
days of that notice either accept or reject the claim. 708 The insurer also has
the duty to make payment within five business days of the notice of accept-
ance and within sixty days after the insurer receives all items, statements,
and forms reasonably requested and required as provided in the statute.7°9
Article 21.55 applies to almost all insurers and all types of claims. More-
over, article 21.55 changes the remedy from the penalty article 3.62 to eight-
een percent damages.710
By deeming the recovery to be damages rather than a penalty, this new
item of damages may be subject to doubling in the event that the conduct
resulting in the delay in payment was committed knowingly under article
21.21 § 16.711
New Article 21.56 requires written notification within ten days of settle-
ment offers made under casualty insurance policies, excluding policies that
require the insured's consent to settlement of a claim against him.712 The
702. Act of May 27, 1991 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 242, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws. 939.
703. Id. § 6.
704. Id. § 7.
705. Id. § 2.
706. Id. § 3.
707. Id. § 3(e).
708. Id. § 4.
709. Id. § 1(4), (5).
710. Id. § 6.
711. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
712. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.56(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
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insurer must notify the insured within thirty days of settlement of a claim. 7 13
B. Burden of Proof
Another significant change made by House Bill 2 is now seen in article
21.58 of the Insurance Code which imposes on the insurer the burden of
proving policy exclusions.7 14 Prior law was that the insurer only had to
plead policy exclusions and the insured then had to disprove them.715 Arti-
cle 21.58 applies to all insurers, without exception, and applies to pending
litigation since it is only a procedural change in the law.716
C. Private Cause of Action under 21.21-2 (The Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act)
In the regular session of 1991, article 21.21-2 was amended to delete the
requirement that the insurer engage in unfair claims settlement practices
"without cause and with such frequency" before the State Board of Insur-
ance could take any action against the company.71 7 Additionally, the State
Board of Insurance can now require an insurer to make periodic reports
without the insurer being "substantially out of line" as it relates to com-
plaints of unfair claims settlement practices.7 18
In the Second Special Session of the Summer of 1991, the legislature again
amended article 21.21-2, specifically making a violation of this statute a de-
ceptive trade practice actionable under the DTPA. 7 19
D. Standard of Review
In Commercial Life Insurance Co v. Texas State Board of Insurance720
Commercial applied to the Board of Insurance (Board) to reserve the name
"Commercial Life Insurance Company" for its future corporate charter.
The Board denied the reservation because the name was similar to other
713. Id. art. 21.56(c).
714. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.58(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
715. Sherman v. Provident Am. Ins. Co., 421 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex. 1967); see also Ameri-
can Home Assur. Co. v. Brandt, 778 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ
denied); National Fire Ins. Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., 777 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1989, writ denied); Britt v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 717 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tex. R. Civ. P. 94.
716. See Holder v. Wood, 714 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. 1986); Chislum v. Home Owners Funding
Corp., 803 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
717. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon Supp. 1992). This amendment codified
Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 134-35 (Tex. 1988) (no proof of
frequency required to find unfair claim settlement practice actionable under art. 21.21).
718. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 § (Vernon Supp. 1992).
719. Id. § 2. This enactment overruled Russell v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., 548
S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) and its progeny, all of which held
that article 21.21-2 of the Insurance Code did not confer a private cause of action upon indi-
viduals injured by unfair claims settlement practices. See McKnight v. Ideal Mutual Insur-
ance Co., 534 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Lone Star Life Insurance Co. v. Griffin, 574
S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Alvarez v. Westchester Fire
Insurance Co., 562 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio (rev'd on other grounds sub.
nom. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Alvarez, 576 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. 1978)).
720. 808 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).
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registered insurance companies. Commercial sued for judicial review of the
Board's order.72' Initially, the trial court dismissed the cause of action be-
cause Commercial neglected to file a timely motion for rehearing with the
Board.722 The court of appeals affirmed.723 The supreme court reversed. 724
At issue was whether the appropriate standard of review was trial de novo
or substantial evidence. 725 The Board contended that the issue of name sim-
ilarity invokes legislative, not judicial considerations. Therefore, the Board
argued, article 1.04() of the Insurance Code, mandating judicial review by
trial de novo, violates the separation of powers requirement of Article II,
section 1 of the Texas Constitution. Relying on Key Western Life Insurance
Co. v. State Board of Insurance, the court of appeals rejected the Board's
constitutional argument.726 The court held that the Board's action over the
name reservation was quasi-judicial since its only function was to determine
whether the requested name was statutorily sufficient. 727 The court con-
cluded that article 1.04(f) was constitutional, denying a substantial evidence
scope of review. 728
The legislature recently addressed the issue of standard of review. It
amended article 1.04(f) of the Insurance Code by eliminating the trial de
novo review and replaced it with a substantial evidence review of any Board
"ruling, action, decision, regulation, order, rate, rule, form, act, or adminis-
trative ruling. '729
721. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.04(0 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (causes of action deter-
mined upon a trial de novo).
722. Commercial Life Ins., 808 S.W.2d at 554.
723. Id.
724. Id.
725. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a § 19(e) (Vernon Supp. 1991) In a trial
de novo the reviewing court cannot receive evidence regarding a previous agency decision but
must determine the issue independent of the agency decision. Under a substantial evidence
standard of review, the record of agency proceedings is considered and determinative unless
substantial rights of the plaintiff have been prejudiced.
726. Commercial Life Ins., 808 S.W.2d at 556 (citing Tex. Const. Ann. art. II § 1 (Vernon




729. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.04(f) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
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